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I. INTRODUCTION

In the frenzied days and weeks following September 11, 2001, many

observers called for serious consideration of a national identity system, the
centerpiece of which would be some form of national identity card. Such
a system was seen mainly as a tool against terrorists and also as a useful
response to illegal immigration, identity theft, and electoral fraud. As yet,
no member of Congress has introduced legislation to establish a formal
national identity system or to require a national identity card,' and the war
on terrorism has turned to other concerns. Nevertheless, the past three
years have seen the most serious and detailed consideration of a national
identity system in a generation,2 and we are probably just one domestic

1. See David Cole, Their Liberties, Our Security: Democracy and Double Standards, 31
INT'L J. LEGAL INFO.

290, 300 (2003).

2. See, e.g.,

ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE
THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 200-01 (2002) (arguing that a national identity card is
"an issue that deserves careful consideration"); DAVID FRUM & RICHARD PERLE, AN END TO EVIL:

How TO WIN THE WAR ON TERROR 69-73 (2003) (advocating anational identity card with biometric
data showing citizenship or immigration status); TOVA WANG, THE DEBATE OVER A NAT!.ONAL
IDENTITY CARD, 1 (2002), availableat http://www.tcf org/4LJ4LMain.asp?SubjectlD=l &TopicID=
0&ArticlelD=284 (last accessed Apr. 22, 2004) ("[P]roposals for creating a national identification
card system have gained new attention."); Donald A. Dripps, Terror and Tolerance: Criminal
JusticefortheNewAge ofAnxiety, I OHIO ST. J.OFCRIM. L. 9,36(2003) ("Ifsecurity professionals
believe national biometric identity cards would contribute substantially to the prevention of
terrorism, then we need to proceed promptly in that direction."); Editorial, A NationalID, N.Y.
TIMES, May 31,2004, at 16 (urging establishment ofa national commission to study identity cards);
Nicholas D. Kristof, May ISee Your ID?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,2004, at A25; see also Wang, supra
at 8-9 (listing proposals for enhancements to identity documents and identification requirements).
Canada and the United Kingdom have also seen recent proposals for a national identity card. Ian
Burrell, Immigration White Paper: Immigrants Will Swear Allegiance to the Queen, THE
INDEPENDENT, Feb. 8, 2002, at 4; Bruce Campion-Smith, ID Cards Seen as "a Slippery Slope,"
TORONTO STAR, Oct. 7, 2003, at A06. India is testing identity cards in several states as part of a
crackdown on illegal immigrants who are seen as a potential terrorist threat. Ruth Sullivan, The
Week Ahead, FINANCIAL TIMES, Mar. 31, 2003, at 40.
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terror attack away from its implementation in some form.3 Even now, all
aliens entering the United States will soon be required to have passports
or visas with biometric identifiers.'
*A national identity system raises a host of policy and legal issues.
Among the former, the most important issue is what the purpose of such
a system would be and whether it would be worth the inevitable financial
and social costs. The answer to that question would help determine the
answers to such subsidiary questions as who would be required to carry an
identity card, what data would be linked to the card, who would have
access to that data, and what uses would be made of it. There are many
possible national identity systems and myriad kinds of, and uses for,
national identity cards.
Scholarly and popular commentary on the possibility of national
identity cards has tended to focus on their effect on individual privacy, or
as some have put it, the right to anonymity. Obviously, privacy is an
extremely important issue because a national identity card has the potential
to alter some fundamental aspects of American life. A national identity
card would undoubtedly enhance governmental access to and use of
information about each person's activities, interests, and associations.
Imposing identity checks would in all likelihood vastly increase the
frequency of contacts with government agents. Although the possible
Fourth and Fifth Amendment ramifications of a national identity system
have often been acknowledged, they have not been explored in depth.5 The
impact on these constitutional rights would of course depend on the
particular features of the system. However, because of their centrality to
any likely national identity system, it is worth examining these issues even
in the absence of a concrete proposal. 6

3. See Wang, supra note 2, at 10 ("[Ilt is likely that some sort of more extensive
identification system will eventually be established in the United States.").
4. Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 §§ 303-04, 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1732-33 (2002). But see Michael Janofsky, Bush Seeks Delays on High-Tech Passports,N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 22, 2004, at A25 (reporting request to Congress for delay, until November 2006, in
demand that foreign entrants without visa have passports with biometric information).
5. COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
IDS-NOT THAT EASY: QUESTIONS ABOUT NATIONWIDE IDENTITY SYSTEMS 7 (Stephen T. Kent &

Lynette I. Millet eds., 2002) [hereinafter NRC REPORT] ("Clearly, an examination of the
legal ... framework surrounding identity systems... would be essential.").
6. NRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 29.
The constitutional limitations on an agent's ability to require presentation of
IDs ... should be explored before any such enactment to avert the costs of
imposing the system and then having to revise or abandon it in the face of its
unconstitutionality, to say nothing of its effects on civil liberties.
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Part II of this Article describes the features most observers regard as
essential to a national identity system. The main point of identity checking
is to make a connection between the identified individual and a collection
of data. To be effective, a national identity system would therefore need to
require that people provide identification at certain times or places. This
requirement would almost certainly produce new interactions between the
populace and law enforcement personnel-a subject regulated by the
Fourth Amendment only when it amounts to a seizure of the person. One
Fourth Amendment question, then, concerns the occasions on which state
agents could demand to see a person's identity card. As the law stands
now, the police may requestto see the identification of anyone at any time
in a so-called consensual encounter that does not involve seizure of the
individual.' On the other hand, the demand to see identification usually
turns the encounter into an investigative detention, which generally
requires that the police have reasonable suspicion of criminality The
United States Supreme Court has, however, approved the use of
suspicionless identification checkpoint stops for certain non-criminal
purposes, such as border control.9
The creation of a duty to carry and present identification at certain
times would presumably take place against this background, while also
moving some of these doctrines into new territory. Could, for example,
every person subjected to an investigative or traffic stop be compelled, on
pain ofprosecution, to show identification? If so, would a national identity
system create an incentive to make more stops, particularly for moving
violations? When could compulsory identity checkpoints be sustained
under the Fourth Amendment administrative-search rationale? Moreover,
would there be Fifth Amendment self-incrimination objections to any of
these identification requirements? Part III addresses the constitutional
questions raised by governmental requests and demands, in a number of
contexts, that a person present an identity card.
An identity check can generate new data as well as draw on existing
databases. The Fourth and Fifth Amendments are also potentially
implicated by the surveillance and monitoring of a person's movement and
activities through such data collection and retention. This is particularly
true of governmental collection of data generated in circumstances in
which there might otherwise be some legitimate expectation of privacy,
such as information provided to health care or educational institutions or
in other registration procedures. Would this data collection be a search
under the Fourth Amendment, and, if so, would it be a reasonable one? As
to more public encounters, law enforcement personnel may generally
7. See infra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 142-76 and accompanying text.
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observe a person while she is in a public place and may even use common
technological aids to do so. Accordingly, some data collection attendant to
identity checks would seem to be exempt from Fourth Amendment
scrutiny. Would a national identity system's frequent and thorough
monitoring of movement and activities be so unlike more common police
surveillance, though, that it would constitute a search and therefore would
be regulated by the Fourth Amendment? If so, at the very least, it could not
be done as a matter of course. Additionally, a potential source of
compelled self-incrimination inheres in this data-generating aspect of a
national identity system: the requirement that certain self-reported
information be conveyed to official databanks. Part IV explores the Fourth
and Fifth Amendment issues raised in the potential data collection and
retention features of a national identity system.
This Article is not concerned with the efficacy of a national
identification system or whether its benefits, however measured, would
outweigh its costs-in other words, whether it is a good idea. The
conclusions ofthis Article are not completely divorced from that question,
however. As this Article will demonstrate, to some degree the Fourth
Amendment will reduce the potential benefits of a national identification
system by standing in the way of practices the system might otherwise
employ. In particular, random identification stops would fly in the face of
Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence. Terrorist profiling checkpoints probably
would not pass Fourth Amendment muster, either, though they might in
certain circumstances. Identification demands in the course of registration
procedures, traffic or investigative stops, or arrests, however, are all
acceptable under the Fourth Amendment. Nor does that Amendment stand
in the way of requesting, rather than demanding, identification of any
person at any time. On the information-gathering side of the process, there
are substantial Fourth Amendment questions raised by mandated reporting
of personal information produced in the course of everyday life. Though
this practice should be regarded as a search, it may not be an unreasonable
one, up to a point. This Article concludes that, in contrast to the Fourth
Amendment's substantial challenges, the Fifth Amendment does not
present a serious obstacle to the most probable national identity system
practices.
Whether all of this discussion leaves the glass of a national identity
card half full or half empty depends on one's perspective. What is fairly
clear is that, while the Constitution might bar certain practices and block
others depending on their purpose and other features, it would be possible
to have a constitutional national identity card system of a fairly
comprehensive type. Even where such an identity system would not strictly
run afoul of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, however, an analysis of the
interests those provisions are designed to protect provides an insight into
the price in privacy and liberty that a national identity card would exact.
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This Article will also indicate how these effects might be mitigated
somewhat in the system's design. In that sense, this Article hopes to
illuminate not only what kind of national identity system the U.S. lawfully
could have, but also how it might be designed, and, implicitly, whether we
want to have one at all.
II. FUNCTIONS AND FEATURES OF A NATIONAL IDENTITY SYSTEM

A. Generally
The basic function of a national identity system would be "to link a
stream of data with a person.... [H]uman identification is the association
of data with a particular human being."'" Once that connection is made,
official reaction can take a variety of forms, depending of course on what
the data show and the legal consequences of that knowledge. Our current
database of outstanding arrest warrants," for example, authorizes the arrest
of the individual linked with such information. 2 In protecting against
terrorists, in general, once the link between an individual and a certain
record was established, the aim would be that "[i]f there were risk factors,
the appropriate measures could be taken to ensure safety."' 3 In a similar
way, the association between a given person and a body of data can be
used for purposes other than crime prevention and enforcement. A national
identity system, it has been suggested, can "aid in fraud prevention (for

10. Roger Clarke, Human Identificationin Information Systems: Management Challenges
and Public Policy Issues, 7 INFO. TECH. & PEOPLE, (No. 4) 6, 8 (1994), available at
http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/HumanID.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2004)
(emphasis omitted).
11. Criminal justice agencies may access the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), a
computerized index of criminal justice information, and locate information on individuals with
outstanding warrants. Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Crime Information Center
(NCIC) -FBI Information Systems, at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/is/ncic.htm (last
updated Apr. 8,2003). Federal, state, and local law enforcement and other criminal justice agencies
utilize the NCIC system to make inquiries about criminals and crimes as well as to promptly
disclose information about crimes and criminals. Id. Data in NCIC are supplied by the FBI and
federal, state, local, and foreign criminal justice agencies and authorized courts. Id.
12. See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1995) (holding the exclusionary rule
inapplicable to a search resulting from the arrest of a suspect erroneously listed in a database as
having an outstanding arrest warrant).
13. Richard Sobel, The Demeaningof Identity and Personhoodin NationalIdentification
Systems, 15 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 319, 334 (2002). See also Does America Need a National
Identifier?HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Government Efficiency, FinancialManagement and
IntergovernmentalRelations of the Comm. on Government Reforms, 107th Cong. 140-42 (2001)
(statement of Tim Hoescht, Senior Vice President of Technology, Oracle Service Industries); see
also FRUM & PERLE, supra note 2, at 71-72 (comparing national identity cards with a "terrorist
watch list").
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example, in the administration of public benefits), catch 'deadbeat dads,'
enable electoral reforms, allow quick background checks for those buying
guns or other monitored items, and prevent illegal aliens from working in
the United States." 4 Either the linked data will tag the identified person for
certain legal consequences, as with arrest warrants and various watch lists,
or it will provide the basis for a profile, which, while not specific to the
person, will instigate other investigative measures.
Any such system depends on two major features: the database (or
databases) containing information about particular individuals and the
means to connect a given person with that information. 5 One way to store
information about a person is on a card or other physical token in humanreadable or machine-readable form. 6 Alternatively, information may be
stored in computer databases elsewhere, in which case there will likely be
points in time at which information about the individual would be accessed
or input or both. "[A] card would likely be but one component of a large
and complex nationwide identity system, the core of which could be a
database of personal information on the U.S. population."' 7 What data to
collect, who would have access to that data, and what uses would be made
of it are major issues in the design of any prospective national identity
system." As is discussed below, these decisions will directly affect the
degree to which the system creates searches or seizures in the Fourth
Amendment sense. 9

14. NRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 6.
15. This is no easy task. For an indication of how much work would need to be done to
construct a standard national database, see U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Information Technology
Terrorist Watch Lists Should be Consolidatedto Promote Better Integrationand Sharing,GAO03-322 at 1-2 (Apr. 15, 2003).
Generally, the federal government's approach to developing and using terrorist
and criminal watch lists in performing its border security mission is diffuse and
nonstandard, largely because these lists were developed and have evolved in
response to individual agencies' unique mission needs and the agencies'
respective legal, cultural, and technological environments.
Id.; see also U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Border Security: New Policies and ProceduresAre
Needed to FillGaps in the Visa Revocation Process,GAO-03-798 (June 18, 2003). In September,
2003, the federal government established a new Terrorist Screening Center to consolidate terrorist
watchlists and used the results in screening by consuls, border agents, other federal officials, and
some private industries. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-6, 39 WEEKLY CowP.
PREs. Doc. 1234 (Sept. 22, 2003); Dan Eggen, PlanforCounterterrorDatabase Unveiled,WASH.
POST, Sept. 17, 2003, at A02.
16. NRC REPORT, supranote 5, at 22.
17. Id. at 5.
18. See id. at 22-28.
19. See discussion infra Part IV.
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In addition to this information cache, any national identity system must
have a means of establishing identity, in the sense of recognizing an
individual as being a specified person. Roger Clarke has produced a
thorough review of the various means of identifying a person in order to
associate data with that person.20 These include appearance, social
behavior, names, codes, knowledge, tokens, bio-dynamics, natural
physiology, and imposed physical characteristics. 2
In any potential national identity system, codes, tokens, and
physiology-or some combination of all three-will likely be the most
useful means of identification. Codes are usually sets of numbers, such as
the Social Security number. Their major advantages over names are that
they are unique, they do not change, and their issuance can be controlled.22
A "token" is a tangible item that a person has in his or her possession.23
Tokens are often documents,24 though they do not have to be; memory
cards or smart cards with encoded data can also serve as identity tokens.
Documentary tokens currently in common use include birth certificates,
passports, drivers' licenses, and Social Security cards.25
Biometrics are identification techniques based on some unique,
physiological, and difficult-to-alienate characteristic.26 Current forms of

20. Clarke, supra note 10, at 6.
21. Id. Clarke gives an interesting account and capsule history of each. He also gives the
following shorthand summary:
I. appearance-or how the person looks;
2. social behaviour--or how the person interacts
with others;
3. names--or what the person is called by other people;
4. codes--or what the person is called by an
organisation;
5. knowledge-or what the person knows;
6. tokens-or what the person has;
7. bio-dynamic---or what the person does;
8. natural physiography-or what the person is; and
9. imposed physical characteristics-or what the
person is now.
Id.
22. Id. at 13.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. For a detailed specification of documents establishing employment authorization and
identity for purposes of verifying authorization to work in the United States, see Immigration and
Nationality Act § 274A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1) (2000) (requiring that identity be established
by U.S. passport, resident alien card, or driver's license).
26. Clarke, supra note 10, at 17. Biometrics are automated methods to identify people using
immutable personal characteristics such as facial features, fingerprints, and retinal patterns. Mark

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol56/iss4/1
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identification often rely on relatively primitive biometrics such as skin,
hair and eye color, physical markings, gender, and facial hair. These
characteristics are often portrayed in a photograph or list of physical
characteristics, such as those used on a driver's license. More
discriminating physiological features that can also be used to establish
identity include fingerprints, DNA patterns, and iris patterns." Such
biometrics serve to link the token within which the biometric information
is contained with the person to whom it is supposed to relate.2" Biometrics
can also be associated directly from the person to the identification, as with
computerized face recognition or iris scans.29 At this point in time,
"biometrics are neither perfectly secure nor perfectly accurate." 30
Codes and biometrics can be combined on a token, and present-day
engineering can make this token hard to duplicate. The National Research
Council Committee on Authentication Technologies and Their Privacy
Implications has sketched out examples, including a magnetic stripe card."'

G. Milone, Biometric Surveillance: Searchingfor Identity, 57 BUS. LAW. 497 (2001); see also
Robin Cooper Feldman, Considerationson the EmergingImplementationofBiometric Technology,
25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 110 (2003), available at http://ssm.conabstract=492444
("Biometrics is the science of identifying people based on their physiological and behavioral
characteristics.").
27. Clarke, supra note 10, at 19.
28. Clarke, supra note 10, at 17.
29. Facial recognition software utilizes computer-linked cameras to scan faces, comparing
the images with electronic images stored in a database. Id.Eye scans analyze either the distinctive
patterns of blood vessels in one's retina at the back of the eye or the unique features of the iris (the
colored part of the eye). Barnaby J. Feder, A Nation Challenged:Biometrics;ExploringTechnology
to ProtectPassengers With Fingerprintor Retina Scans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2001, at B3.
30. Feldman, supra note 26, at 110.
31. NRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 38. Further:
Another possibility is a memory card (or storage card), which would hold more
information and be more expensive than the magnetic stripe cards of the previous
example. These cards contain memory as well as some security logic to prevent
unauthorized reading or tampering with their data. The information contained on
them could be digitally signed (that is, a number would be associated with that
information that is dependent on a secret known only to the signer as well as on
the data itself) to prevent easy counterfeiting. The correspondence between the
user and the card (along with the information on the card and in the database)
could be ascertained through biometric authentication, which would be undertaken
using special equipment-such as a reader for fingerprints or iris scans-in
addition to presentation of the card. An additional possibility is to use smart card
technology that permits computation (such as digital signatures and encryption)
to take place on the card itself.
Though successful attacks have taken place, these cards are even harder to
counterfeit than memory cards. They might have a name, photo, number, and
biometric data, all of which could be cryptographically signed. The data would be
backed up in a database to enable checking when reissuing a card and checking
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Another proposal recently made, and retracted, includes an enhanced and
standardized state driver's license.32 It must be recognized, however, that
"[tihe best that any system ofauthentication can do is provide a compelling
connection with some previous verification of identity."33 In other words,
identity documents or other tokens are only as good as the breeder
documents that produced them; "[t]he accuracy of each layer of
identification depends on the accuracy of preceding layers."34 While this
limitation may mean that no identification system can ensure completely
that a given individual is who she claims to be, this problem goes more to
the efficacy of a national identity system than to any question of legality.
This capsule summary of the functions and broad features of a national
identity system may sound familiar to anyone living in early twenty-first
century America because identification linked to information is already
part of daily life. Some would argue that we already have a national
identity system based primarily on the Social Security number.35 Richard
Sobel, for example, contends that even prior to September 11, a national
identity system "was developing from the combination of government
databanks and ID requirements" due to several pieces of federal legislation
that combine demands for identification with computerized records.36

for duplicates when the card is first issued. A card of this sort could engage in a
real-time, cryptographic exchange with an online system to verify a user's
identity-possibly without exposing details of that identity to the organization
performing the data capture-for example, an airline or a retail establishment.
Id. at39.
32. See Sobel, supra note 13, at 336 (reporting that the American Association of Motor
Vehicle Administrators called for linking driver's license records with Social Security, immigration,
and law enforcement databases); see also, Richard Edwardson, National Identification Systems and
Privacy Rights, 2002 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 4 (2002).
33. NRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 20.
34. Lynn M. Lopucki, Human Identification Theory andthe Identity Theft Problem,80 TEx.
L. REV. 89,98 (2001); see also The Alias Among Us: The Homeland Security and Terrorismfrom
Document Fraud, Identity Theft and Social Security Number Misuse: Hearing Before Senate
Comm. on Finance, 107th Cong. 2 (2003) (statement of Robert J. Cramer, Managing Director,
Office of Special Investigations, General Accounting Office) (finding that government officials
generally did not recognize counterfeit documents in General Accounting Office attempts to obtain
genuine driver's licenses).
35. See, e.g., Rick S. Lear & Jefferson D. Reynolds, Your Social Security Number or Your
Life: DisclosureofPersonalIdentificationInformation by MilitaryPersonnelandthe Compromise
of Privacyand NationalSecurity, 21 B.U. INTL. L. J. 1, 13-14 (2003).
36. Sobel, supranote 13, at 323-32 (asserting that the five basic parts of an incipient national
identification system are the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100
Stat. 3359 (1986) [hereinafter IRCA], the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 to 3009-724 (1996) [hereinafter IIRIRA],
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) [hereinafter Welfare Reform Act], the Health Insurance Portability and
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Other proposed legislation would move the United States in the direction
of a national identity system without formally establishing one.37 In
addition, without new legislation, governmental agencies are installing
"smart card" identity systems for their own workers and those whom they
regulate.3" One object of a true national identity system would be to allow
access to information contained in several unrelated databases through one
centralized system.39
B. Demandsfor Identification
Any system that depends on linking an individual with a certain
identity, and hence to a body of data, must require people to identify
themselves at some point or points in time, whether that identification is
made by way of codes, tokens, biometrics, or some other means.40 In
theory, participation in an identification system can be voluntary or
mandatory. An example of a "voluntary" program is the proposal for a
"trusted traveler" card, which would exempt airline passengers from
certain pre-flight inspections. 4' While possession and use of such a card
would be voluntary,42 the need to present it to gain the benefits of the

Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936(1996) [hereinafter HIPPA], and
the Transportation Security Administration's ID requirementand Computer Assisted Passenger PreScreening System, 49 C.F.R. § 1544.201 (2004) [hereinafter CAPPS]. Sobel also mentions
educational databanks. Id. at 323 n. 13. A Social Security number is used by the military, appears
on military identity cards, and must be given to captors by service members. Lear & Reynolds,
supra note 35, at 4-8.
37. DoesAmerica Needa Nationalldentifer?HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Government
Efficiency, FinancialManagement and Intergovernmental Relations of the House Comm. on
Government Reform, 107th Cong. 123 (2002) [hereinafter Does America Need a National
Identifier?](statement of Katie Corrigan, Legislative Counsel, ACLU) ("No member of Congress
has introduced legislation that would implement a national ID system or ID card. Instead, there are
several proposals that would establish a national ID card or system through the 'backdoor' of other
proposed legislation."); see also sources cited supranote 2.
38. Sara Kehaulani Goo, An ID with a High IQ: 'Smart Cards 'Are in Demand as Concerns
About Security Rise, but PrivacyIssues Loom, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2003, at H01.
39. Does America Need a National Identifier?,supra note 37, at 120.
40. See supra text accompanying note 21.
41. See, e.g., David Jones, What's Your 'Risk Score'?, INTHESE TIMES, June 23, 2003, at 17
(advocating that a trusted traveler program "would allow travelers to speed through airport security
if they voluntarily agreed to undergo an extensive background check and carried a card with a
digital fingerprint or other biometric identifier"); Alan M. Dershowitz, Why Fear National ID
Cards?,N.Y. TIMES, OCT. 13,200 1,atA23 (arguing that an optional identity card would be allowed
to pass through security "more expeditiously"); see also, Sarah D. Scalet, Who Do You Trust?, CIO
MAG., Jan. 1, 2003, at 32 (referring to a trusted traveler program as the "post-9/1 1 version of first
class").
42. Cf, NRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 28 ("[E]ven when a system is nominally voluntary,
attention should be paid to whether the large inconveniences of nonparticipation make it effectively
mandatory.").
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program would not. Virtually any true national identity system necessitates
mandatory participation, both in the sense of having an identity within the
system and in presenting identification when required. 3 This is certainly
true for a system whose object is discovery of undocumented migrants;
some required proof of lawful presence in the United States would seem
to be a sine qua non of its operation. Realistically, demands for
presentation of identification are inherent in any national identity system
that would be worth having."
Observers fear, however, that these identification encounters would
have several inevitable effects. First, people would be required to carry the
identification card or other token and present it at designated interactions.45
Second, at least some of these encounters would entail involuntary stops
to present the identity token and would thus interfere with free movement,
as well as impose dignitary harms. "Day-to-day individuals could be asked
for ID when they are walking down the street, applying for a job or health
insurance or entering a building. ' 6 There is also some fear that these
identification checks would be disproportionately directed at members of
minority groups.47
None of these apprehensions is without precedent. Even today, Belgium
has a comprehensive national identity system, and police officers can ask
to see the identity card of any person found in public.4 When the British
used identity cards for commodity rationing during and after World War
II, police demanded to see the cards at other times, leading to protests and,
ultimately, the end of the program in 1952.' 9 Identity cards were essential
to South Africa's apartheid system. They also proved very helpful to Nazi

43. Id.
44. Id. ("In general, any attempt to ascertain that an individual does not possess an unwanted
attribute--for example, malicious intent--requires a complete knowledge of behaviors related to

that attribute, and hence mandatory checks.").
45. Sobel, supra note 13, at 338-39, 363.
46. Does America Need a National Identifier?, supra note 37, at 113 (statement of Katie

Corrigan, Legislative Counsel, ACLU).
47. Id. at 114, 118 (statement of Katie Corrigan, Legislative Counsel, ACLU).
48. Id.at 107th Cong. 107-18 (statement of Katie Corrigan, Legislative Counsel, ACLU; see
id. at 129, 131 (statement of Rudi Veestraeten, Counselor and Consul, Embassy of Belgium)

("Although such request on behalf of a law enforcement agency does not needto be motivated, it
mostly occurs only when there is a particular reason for a police officer to do so (suspicious
behavior, events, security reasons)."). In Hong Kong, adults must register, obtain an identity card,
and carry it at all times: "No probable cause is needed to inspect a person's card; police routinely
stop people on the street for the very purpose of inspecting their HKID cards." Rina C.Y. Chung,
Hong Kong's "Smart" Identity Card: DataPrivacy Issues and Implicationsfor a Post-September
I 1th America, 4 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 518, 527-28 (2003).

49. Sobel, supra note 13, at 347.
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and Rwandan genocidal killers, who used them to identify and locate
members of their target ethnic groups.5"
In addition to the burdens of carrying identification and producing it on
demand, required presentation of identity tokens might have other effects
on individuals' freedom from unreasonable search and seizure. One is the
monitoring of individual movement and activity. Each identification
encounter would be an occasion to add information to the central database,
facilitating government surveillance ofmovement and activity.5' Some fear
that in any high-integrity identifier scheme, "[a]ll human behaviour would
become transparent to the State, and the scope for non-conformism and
dissent would be muted to the point envisaged by the dystopian
novelists."52
Conversely, each identification encounter would contain the potential
for the resulting information, rightly or wrongly, to cause a further
interference with personal mobility. This effect would depend, of course,
on what the information is and how it is used. Historically, some identity
cards have served, in effect, as internal passports. "Under the most
repressive regimes, such as those in Communist Eastern Europe, inhabitant
registration schemes were instrumental in the prevention ofunauthori[z]ed
movement both within the country and out of it."53
The Transportation Security Administration (and its forerunner) has
had a computer-based airline passenger screening in place since the late
1990s and is currently testing an updated version called CAPPS 1I." The
CAPPS II system collects a passenger's personal information such as
name, address, birth date, and credit card number. It then checks this
information against governmental and commercial databases, including
criminal history records, to produce a passenger security code of green,
yellow, or red.55 According to the Transportation Safety Administration,
this process will "allow 'dynamic targeting on a real-time basis."' 56 Those
50. Id.at 343-49.
51. Does America Need a National Identifier?, supra note 37, at 113.
52. Clarke, supra note 10, at 34.
53. Id. at 27. This was also true in a more rudimentary form for slaves in the antebellum
South. Sobel, supra note 13, at 343.
54. Joe Sharkey, A Safer Sky or Welcome to Flight1984?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,2003, at C9.
55. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and
Address Challenges, GAO-04-232T, at 18 (Nov. 2003) (statement ofCathleen A. Berrick, Director,
Homeland Security and Justice Issues); Sharkey, supra note 54, at C9; see also Matthew L. Wald,
U.S. Agency Scales Back Data Required On Air Travel, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2003, at A18
(reporting that the Transportation Safety Administration "will not use any information on a
passenger's credit, like a returned check or unpaid bill, nor any health records"); Plansto Step Up
Security ScreeningforAirlinePassengersHave Been Derailed(Morning Edition, National Public
Radio, Aug. 1, 2003).
56. Wald, supra note 55 (quoting Nuala O'Connor Kelly, the department's chief privacy
officer). Furthermore, "'[tihe risk assessment function ... will determine the likelihood that a
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passengers receiving a rating of red will be denied boarding, something
that has happened under the existing CAPPS system."
In sum, it is almost inevitable that any national identity system, whether
total or partial, will require individuals to present identification at certain
times and places because "[t]he absence of the power to demandevidence
of identity weakens the integrity of a general-purpose identification
' Just which occasions would require an identification check is
scheme."58
an important issue in the system design. At present, individuals must
provide specified forms of identification to prove employment
authorization at the time of hire,5 9 to obtain a passport,' or to board an
airplane. 6' The provision of a Social Security number (often without actual
production of the card) attends other transactions. 2 Increased demands for
identification, probably through presentation of a token or some other
identification mechanism, are almost inevitable if a national identity
system is established. Moreover, once the system is in place, the tendency
will be to use it and, over time, to expand its use.63
III. IDENTITY CARD REQUESTS AND DEMANDS

The Fourth Amendment bars "unreasonable searches and seizures,"
including seizures of the person.' Evaluating the effect of the Fourth
Amendment on demands for identification involves determining first
whether the demand involves a "seizure." If not, the Fourth Amendment
inquiry is at an end. If the encounter does entail a "seizure" the second
question is whether it is one that is "unreasonable." All manner of statepassenger is a known terrorist, or has identifiable links to known terrorists."' Id(quoting Jay C.
Stanley, spokesman for the Technology and Liberty program of the ACLU). There are also plans
eventually to identify people for whom there are warrants for violent crimes. Ricardo AlonsoZaldivar, Critics Wary ofNew Traveler ProfileSystem, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2003, at A19.
57. Jones, supra note 41.
58. Clarke, supra note 10, at 27.
59. See supranote 25.
60. U.S.

Dep't of State, How to Apply

in Person for a

US. Passport, at

http://travel.state.gov/passport obtaintext.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2004) (requiring previous
U.S. passport; naturalization certificate, certificate of citizenship, or current, valid driver's license
or government or military identification along with a Social Security number).
61. Sobel, supra note 13, at 325 ("Since October 1995, the Federal Aviation Administration
('FAA') has required airlines to ask passengers to identify themselves with government-issued
photo identification.").

62. Id. at 324-27.
63. Clarke, supranote 10, at 27 ("It is only to be expected that various pressure-groups will

seek to increase the impositions as time goes by, in response to such problems as illegal
immigration, perceived worsening of law and order, epidemics, natural disasters, national security
emergencies, etc."). In addition, there is the real possibility ofabuse ofwhatever system results. See
discussion infra Part III.
64. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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citizen interactions are potentially implicated by identity card checking,
and the Fourth Amendment analysis will be similarly varied. This Part
proceeds by both applying existing Fourth Amendment principles to the
kinds of situations in which a national identity card would likely be
requested or demanded and evaluating the effects that a widespread
national identity system would have on the law itself.
A. ConsensualInteractions
Not every presentation of identification entails a seizure. For reasons
of her own, an individual may choose to interact with a state agent who
requests her identification, and the additional step of producing
identification will usually not convert that voluntary encounter to a seizure.
There are, however, degrees of voluntariness. Moreover, an intrusive
national identity system would, itself,probably affect how people perceive
and react to identity checks.
At present, one occasion for mandatory identification occurs when
individuals must give identification information over the telephone, over
the internet, or by mail. This identification is usually some combination of
name, code (e.g., Social Security or credit card number), and knowledgebased (e.g., PIN, mother's maiden name) identifiers.6 Because there is no
personal restraint, nothing even remotely approaching a seizure is involved
in this kind of exchange.
At the level of personal interaction, identification is currently required
during what may be described as registration procedures. These include
registration for driver's licenses, medical services, schools, and flights, as
well as employment eligibility verification. Airport check-in is the
paradigm and now necessitates government-issued photo identification.'
All of these tasks may require the customer to stop to register, and while
the display of identification tokens may slightly lengthen the process, it is
unlikely that those additional moments would convert the registration
process to a state-mandated seizure.
The Supreme Court has refused to find a seizure in governmental
questioning and identification requests of people already in confining
circumstances. In INS v. Delgado,for example, immigration agents moved
through a factory, questioning workers and then asking for immigration
papers from those who appeared not to be citizens.67 These requests for
identification were held not to be seizures, because in the Court's view, the
workers had no reasonable fear that they could not continue working or

65. See supra note 21.
66. See supra note 61.

67. 466 U.S. 210, 212-13 (1984).
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moving about the factory.68 INS agents also took positions near the factory
exits. 6 9 The Court rejected the claim that the entire workforce was thereby
seized, because "[o]rdinarily, when people are at work their freedom to
move about has been meaningfully restricted, not by the actions of law
enforcement officials, but by the workers' voluntary obligations to their
employers."7 The Court has followed this approach in two cases
upholding police requests for permission to search the luggage or persons
of interstate bus travelers.7 Although the passengers' freedom of
movement had been limited, the restriction flowed, according to the Court,
not from police conduct, but from their status as passengers on a bus.72
This reasoning easily applies to identification requests that are ancillary to
other required official interactions, such as the registration procedures
described above. Further, this reasoning strongly suggests that a national
identity system could mandate the display of identification at other
registration points, such as hotel or car rental check-ins, without creating
any seizure of the person, so long as the registration would, by itself,
ordinarily restrict movement.
Moreover, similar reasoning allows law enforcement agents to
approach people and ask for identification even when their freedom of
movement is not already limited by their own actions or decisions; in other
words, as they go about their business in public. As long as a reasonable
person would feel free to "terminate the encounter" in the circumstances,
then the person has not been seized.73 Instead, the person is participating
in what the Court has called a "consensual matter. ' 74 A request for
identification documents falls within the scope ofa consensual encounter.75
The Court has recently stated, "Even when law enforcement officers have

68. Id. at 220-21.
69. Id. at 210-11.
70. Id. at 218.

71. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429
(1991).

72. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436; Drayton, 536 U.S. at 201-02.
73. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-36.
74. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 504 (1983); see also Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 at 221. The
Court's conclusion that a reasonable person would truly feel free to decline law enforcement
requests for conversation, identification, travel documents, and permission to search has been
criticized as an unrealistic characterization of how people actually react to these tactics. See Janice
Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153,
164-206 (2002); Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Supreme Court, Criminal Procedure and Judicial
Integrity, 40 Am.CRiM.L. REV. 133,135-41 (2003); Daniel J. Steinbock, The Wrong Line Between
Freedom and Restraint: The Unreality, Obscurity, and Incivility of the Fourth Amendment
ConsensualEncounter Doctrine,38 SAN DEGo L. REv. 507, 521-35 (2001).

75. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552 (1980). If the individual declines to
answer questions or requests for identification, "and the police take additional steps ...to obtain
an answer," however, then a detention has occurred. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216-17.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol56/iss4/1

16

Steinbock: National Identity Cards: Fourth and Fifth Amendment Issues

NATIONAL IDENTITY CARDS: FOURTH AND FIFTHAMENDMENT ISSUES

no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may pose questions
[and] ask for identification.., provided they do not induce cooperation by
coercive means,"76 a holding that reiterates statements in earlier cases."
This doctrine has important implications for any national identity
system. Law enforcement agents could approach an individual on the street
and request to see a national identity card at any time, without any prior
suspicion ofcriminality or other illegality. In a sense, an American national
identity system could resemble the present Belgian one78 as long as the
interactions were requests and not commands. Simple requests for
identification would probably produce compliance in the large majority of
cases.79 This possibility, however, raises one of the dangers of law
enforcement use of consensual encounters. Because the Fourth
Amendment does not govern such interactions, they can be initiated for no
reason or for any reason at all, including the "racial stereotyping that is,
unfortunately, prevalent in every area of unregulated police discretion."8
As a means of identity checking, then, consensual encounters run the risk
of being employed on the basis of apparent race, ethnicity, or national
origin (or at least of being perceived to be conducted on such grounds).
Since September 11th, the debate on police profiling understandably
has shifted from crime detection to the role of racial, ethnic, national, and
religious factors in preventing terrorism. Given that averting terrorism
would presumably be the principal goal of any national identity system,
such profiles could easily figure in its design and use. Airport inspections
and immigration enforcement, to name two contexts, have already been
criticized for their use of ethnic and national criteria,8 ' but some have
contended that such use is a rational response to the current terrorism

76. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 201 (2002).
77. See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216 (citing Royer, 460 U.S. at 501).
78. See sources cited supra note 48.
79. Cf Illya D. Lichtenberg, Voluntary Consent or Obedience to Authority: An Inquiry Into
the "Consensual" Police-Citizen Encounter 199 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers
University, on file with author) (reporting that 89% of motorists acceded to police requests to
search their vehicles).
80. Steinbock, supra note 74, at 509; see also DAviD COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND
CLASS INTHE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

47-52 (1999). The Court has made clear on

several occasions that an officer's subjective motivation for an otherwise lawful practice, even one
based on racial or ethnic factors, is irrelevant to its legality under the Fourth Amendment. Bond v.
United States, 529 U.S. 334, 339 (2000); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 816 (1996).
81. See, e.g., David A. Harris, Racial Profiling Revisited: "Just Common Sense " in the Fight
Against Terror?, 17 CRim. JUST. 36, 40-41 (2002) (describing immigration enforcement and
questioning directed against persons from the Middle East); Deborah A. Ramirez, et al., Defining
Racial Profiling in a Post-September )) World, 40 Am.CIUM. L. REV. 1195 (2003) (criticizing the
use of ethnic and religious profiling in the war against terrorism); Leti Volpp, Critical Race Studies:
The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1576-86 (2002) (describing the profiling
of those who appeared "Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim" after September 11).
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threat.8 2 Because the Fourth Amendment generally puts so little restraint
on racial, national, and ethnic profiling in police law enforcement
decisions, it is especially important that the profiling issue be addressed in
the legislation creating any national identity system.
In a true consensual encounter, no person could be compelled to

produce her identity card. After all, the whole premise of a consensual
encounter is voluntariness on the part of the citizen, so individuals have a
perfect right to say no. 3 While consensual encounters are not at all
uncommon as an investigative technique, particularly for drug
interdiction, 4 they are not currently imposed on large segments of the U.S.
population, as would be the case if they became an integral part of identity
checking. 5 If a true cross-section of the American population were
routinely asked by government agents to show their identity cards, the
incidence of"consensual" compliance might decline drastically. A national
identity system that depended on voluntary responses to requests for
identification would thus run the risk of perfectly legal, and possibly
organized, civil disobedience.8 6 It is unlikely, therefore, that a national
82. See, e.g., DERSHOWITZ,supranote 2, at 208 ("It is foolish ... to misallocate our resources
in the fight against suicide bombers by devoting equal attention to searching an eighty-year-old
Christian woman from Maine and a twenty-two-year-old Muslim man from Saudi Arabia.");
Stephen J. Ellmann, Racial Profilingand Terrorism,22 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L& COMP. L. 327,328
(2003) ("So long as our adversaries tend to be members of definable groups, in principle we should
be able to find them if we take group membership into account, not as either a necessary or a
sufficient factor, but as a relevant one."); William J. Stuntz, Local PolicingAfter the Terror, 111
YALE L.J. 2137, 2179 (2002) ("[O]ne could plausibly conclude that the efficiency gains from
profiling outweigh the harm from the ethnic tax that post-September 11 policing is imposing on
young men of Middle Eastern origin."); see also U.S. Dep't of Just., Fact Sheet: Racial Profiling,
June 17, 2003, at 5-6, at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/June/racial profilingfact-sheet.pdf
("[R]ace and ethnicity may be used in terrorist identification to the extent permitted by the nation's
laws and the Constitution.").
83. Steinbock, supra note 74, at 540-42.
84. Nadler, supra note 74, at 159 ("[Llaw enforcement agencies capitalized on the Bostick
decision by stepping up their efforts to root out drug trafficking on interstate buses.").
85. COLE, supra note 80, at 8 ("[P]olice officers routinely use methods of investigation and
interrogation against members ofracial minorities and the poor that would be deemed unacceptable
if applied to more privileged members of the community.").
86. By way of analogy, as of March 16, 2004, 269 communities in thirty-eight states had
passed anti-Patriot Act resolutions. ACLU, List of Communities That Have PassedResolutions,
availableathttp://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=l 1294&c=207 (last visited Apr.
12, 2004). This includes three statewide resolutions. Id.These communities include the following:
the State of Vermont; the State of Alaska; the State of Hawaii; New York City, New York;
Princeton, New Jersey; Chicago, Illinois; Boulder, Colorado; Santa Fe, New Mexico; Cambridge,
Massachusetts; Berkeley, California; Amherst, Massachusetts; Carrboro, North Carolina; and
Oakland, California. Michael Janofsky, Threats and Responses: Civil Liberties; Cities Wary of
Antiterror Tactics PassCivil Liberties Resolutions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2002, at Al. Although
these resolutions are primarily symbolic, many provide specific legal justifications for the noncooperation of local authorities in activities that could be considered in violation of civil liberties
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identity system could rely solely, or mainly, on consensual compliance as
a means of identity verification.
B. Investigative Stops
In contrast to a consensual encounter, the compelled detention of a
person for investigation, including a demand for identification, constitutes
a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.17 Though the real-life, factual
differences between them can be quite small, an investigative stop is
conceptually quite different from a consensual encounter. Under Terry v.
Ohio"8 and its numerous Supreme Court progeny, 9 such seizures can be
conducted only on "specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the]
intrusion."9' These facts and inferences can relate to an ongoing crime or
to a past felony.9 The level of evidence needed for a lawful stop is often
called reasonable or articulable suspicion and can be distinguished from
' or "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion,"93
"inarticulate hunches"92
which are not sufficient to confer authority to compel a person to halt for
investigation.
Under this body of law, persons could not involuntarily be seized on a
random or individual basis for identity checks in the absence of reasonable
suspicion. The Supreme Court so held in Brown v. Texas, in which an
officer stopped Brown for the sole reason of discovering his identity.94
Because the officer lacked any basis for believing Brown to be involved in
criminal activity, the seizure violated the Fourth Amendment.95 The
Supreme Court similarly has barred the suspicionless stopping of motor
vehicles to check license and registration96 or for questioning about a
traveler's citizenship.97 These cases obviously constitute an obstacle,
though, as we shall see below, not necessarily an insurmountable obstacle,

or constitutional rights. See id.
87. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
88. Id
89. See, e.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25
(2000); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1989); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,
417-18 (1981).
90. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
91. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985).
92. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.
93. Id. at 27.
94. 443 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1979).
95. Id. at 52.
96. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979).
97. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,884 (1975). This holding does not apply
at the border or its functional equivalents. Id

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 1

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 56

to the effectiveness of any national identity system that depends on more
than spot checking of the already suspicious.98
In those cases where reasonable suspicion to stop a person is present,
mandatory possession of an identity card or other identity token would
greatly enhance both the utility of the investigative stop and the possibility
of abuse. As things stand now, the officer may demand identification and
may even in some cases search for it,99 but without statutory authority
criminalizing noncompliance,' 00 the officer has no way of securing it. Even
then, addressing a statute requiring "'credible and reliable' identification
that carries a 'reasonable assurance' of its authenticity," in Kolender v.
Lawson, the Court found the law void for vagueness.' In the Court's
opinion, this standard gave excessive discretion to the police, opening the
possibility of discriminatory enforcement.'0 2
The vagueness problem in Kolender could presumably be remedied by
a careful specification ofjust what kind of identity documentation the law
requires.° 3 A standard and relatively secure identity token would seem to
be an essential feature of any national identity system, " ' and it would be
surprising if such an identity card did not satisfy the vagueness objections
voiced in Kolender.In other words, the specification of a national identity
card as adequate (or necessary) proof ofidentity would remove uncertainty
about what constitutes proper identification.
98. See infra text accompanying notes 238-46.
99. Generally, the warrantless search and seizure of a defendant's wallet to find proof of
identity during an investigatory stop constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure. Schraff v.
State, 544 P.2d 834,840-51 (Alaska 1975); Baldwin v. State, 418 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982);
State v. Miller, No. C6-93-1976, 1994 WL 246072 (Minn. Ct. App. June 7, 1994); State v. Webber,
694 A.2d 970 (N.H, 1997); State v. Newman, 637 P.2d 143, 146 (Or. 1981); Commonwealth v.
Briscoe, No. K99185,2001 WL 1830019 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 13,2001); State v. Beegle, Nos. 208346-II, 20835-4-Il1 2003 WL 21652737 (Wash. Ct. App. July 15, 2003); State v. Biegel, 787 P.2d
577, 578-79 (Wash. App. 1990). However, a California Court of Appeal found that the seizure of
a defendant's wallet for the purpose of identifying the defendant was within the scope of an
investigatory detention. People v. Loudermilk, 241 Cal. Rptr. 208 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). Also, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the search of a defendant's wallet
during an investigatory stop was reasonable when border patrol agents had reasonable suspicion
that the defendant was an illegal alien and the defendant refused to disclose his identity or
citizenship status. United States v. Garcia, 942 F.2d 873, 877 (5th Cir. 1991).
100. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN., § 38.02(a) (2004) ("A person commits an offense if
he intentionally refuses to give his name, residence address, or date of birth to a peace officer who
has lawfully arrested the person and requested the information."). The 1974 version of this statute
was quoted in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47,49 n. 1 (1979), and provides similar statutory authority.
101. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,359 (1983) (quoting CAL. PENALCoDE § 647(e)). The
code required a person "[w]ho loiters or wanders upon the streets .... without apparent reason or
business" to provide a "'credible and reliable identification' and to account for his or her presence.
Id. at 354 n. 1, 356 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(e)).
102. Id. at 360-61.
103. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 25.
104. See supra text accompanying note 25.
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That solution would directly raise two additional issues: whether either
the Fourth or Fifth Amendment stands in the way of requiring that
someone stopped on reasonable suspicion present her identity card. The
Supreme Court's recent decision in Hiibel v. Sixth JudicialDistrictCourt
of Nevada goes a long way toward settling both questions."0 5 Hiibel was
stopped at the side of a road by an officer investigating a report of a fight,
and the officer repeatedly asked him for identification. On Hiibel's refusal
he was arrested, and later convicted, for obstructing police business in
contravention of a Nevada statute requiring persons stopped in suspicious
circumstances to identify themselves.
Acknowledging a line of dicta dating back to Terry itself suggesting
that a suspect had a right to refuse to answer all questions during a stop,' °6
a 5-4 majority rejected the Fourth Amendment challenge to the Nevada
statute. Said the Court, "The request for identity has an immediate relation
to the purpose, rationale, and practical demands of a Terry stop."' 7 One
use of the suspect's identification mentioned by the Court is discovery of
outstanding warrants, which can usually come about only by checking the
suspect's identity against a database.
It is true that once the police have articulable suspicion that a person is
committing or planning a crime there is a reasonable likelihood that an
identity check, especially one that tapped into criminal history and law
enforcement databases, would produce useful information.° 8 For example,
if the reasonable suspicion concerned drug sale or possession, access to a
criminal history for those or related crimes would at least intensify the
investigation."" Similarly, stored data might confirm a suspect's
story-that, for example, he works in the isolated area in which he was
found-and thus dispel suspicion. There are myriad ways in which access

105. 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004).
concurring). The Court noted:
106. See, e.g., Kolender, 461 U.S. at 366 (Brennan, J.,
[U]nder the Fourth Amendment, police officers with reasonable suspicion that
an individual has committed or is about to commit a crime may detain that
individual, using some force if necessary, for the purpose of asking investigative
questions. They may ask their questions in a way calculated to obtain an answer.
But they may not compel an answer, and they must allow the person to leave after
a reasonably briefperiod of time unless the information they have acquired during
the encounter has given them probable cause sufficient to justify an arrest.
concurring) (citations omitted).
Id. (Brennan, J.,
107. Hibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2459.
108. Justice Stevens recognized this fact in his dissent ("A name can provide the key to abroad
array of information about the person, particularly in the hands of a police officer with access to a
range of law enforcement databases."). Id. at 2464 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109. See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996) (the fact that the suspects were
listed as drug dealers in the Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information System [NADDIS]
database of known and suspected drug traffickers was an important element in the finding of
reasonable suspicion).
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to the suspect's identity could further the investigation. As the Court noted
in Hiibel,probably the most significant effect of database-linked identity
checks would be the discovery of outstanding warrants, which themselves
would provide a basis for the suspect's arrest." ° In short, a national
identity card would make many investigative stops more efficient and
effective.
Hiibel introduced some uncertainty on two issues important to the use
of national identity cards in Terry stops. As the Court took pains to point
out, the Nevada statute at issue in Hiibel had been interpreted to require
that the suspect disclose his name, but not necessarily provide his driver's
license or any other document. If this distinction were important to the
holding, it would obviously undermine Hiibel's support for insistence on
identity card presentation. It seems likely, however, that this language is
simply the usual confining of a case to its facts rather than a suggested
prohibition on document demands.
Second, the Court stated in Hiibelthat under established stop and frisk
principles, "an officer may not arrest a suspect for failure to identify
himself if the identification request is not reasonably related to the
circumstances justifying the stop.""' Is there, then, a category of stops in
which a demand for identification would be constitutionally unreasonable?
The Ninth Circuit has said yes, and found criminal punishment for refusal
to give identification during a Terry stop to violate the Fourth Amendment
when identification is not needed in the investigation. 2 There is not much
reason, however, to follow this line of cases. While there could be some
circumstances in which requiring the suspect's identity card would not
advance the officer's inquiry, merely asking for or reading it would not
seem to add appreciably to the stop's intrusiveness. Moreover, it seems
silly and unworkable to ask the officer on the street to distinguish between
stops where identification would further the investigation and those in
which it would not. Rather, this would seem an area where a bright-line
rule would make good sense." 3
On the other hand, as the Court recognized in Hiibel,"4 if the suspect
were detained for an appreciable period of additional time, moved, or
110. If a national visa database could also be accessed, it is also likely that a fair number of
allegedly undocumented aliens would be identified.
I1l. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459.
112. Martinelli v. City of Beaumont, 820 F.2d 1491, 1494 (9th Cir. 1987); Lawson v.
Kolender, 658 F.2d 1362, 1364-69 (9th Cir. 1981).
113. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (stressing police officers' need
to make quick ad hoc judgments); see also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979)
("A single familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and
expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific
circumstances they confront.").
114. Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2459.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol56/iss4/1

22

Steinbock: National Identity Cards: Fourth and Fifth Amendment Issues

NA77ONAL IDENTITY CARDS: FOURTH AND FIFTHAMENDMENT ISSUES

placed in a more confined area in connection with the identity check, then
the process might be more intrusive than a Terry stop allows. "5 This could
happen, for example, if the identity information had to be transmitted to a
database and a reply took some time to arrive. While in theory an identity
check could be accomplished in the time it takes to authorize a credit card
transaction, a glitch in database access or communication is certainly
possible. A prolonged detention pending the outcome of a database
search
16
would not be a reasonable incident of an investigative stop.1
A further objection to requiring presentation of an identification token
on pain of criminal prosecution is that if the police may arrest a person for
failing to identify herself during a Terry stop, then identification statutes
"bootstrap the authority to arrest on less than probable cause."' 7 There is
very little to this argument. If the state can legitimately require people to
carry identity cards and they fail to produce them at statutorily specified
moments, then at that point there is probable cause to arrest for that crime
even if probable cause to arrest for the circumstances that produced the
stop never developed. Perhaps the fear is that the police would demand
identification only, or mainly, from those whom they wanted to arrest for
the underlying offense, but could not. If a national identity system were in
existence, this tactic might actually succeed in producing an arrest for
failure or refusal less frequently, because more people would easily be able
to supply identification. In any event, it is hard to see how the possibility
that an otherwise lawful stop might lead to an arrest for an unrelated crime
somehow makes the stop itself, based upon pre-existing, independent
grounds, questionable under the Fourth Amendment. Terry stops can, for
example, lead to assaults on the investigating officers or obstruction of
police business in ways unrelated to the reason for the stop, and the
validity of those charges is beyond question.
Hiibel also held that the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause, by
itself or in conjunction with the Fourth Amendment, does not prevent
officers from demanding the names of those stopped on reasonable

115. A stop, the Court has said, may last as long as is reasonably necessary to conform or
dispel the officer's suspicions. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). At some point,
a stop cannot be justified on the basis of reasonable suspicion, but becomes tantamount to an arrest
and thus requires probable cause. Id. at 685. In UnitedStates v. Place, the Court held that a ninetyminute detention alone rendered the seizure unreasonable. 462 U.S. 696 709-10 (1983). Otherwise,
the Court has assessed the issue as one of overall reasonableness. Important factors in this
assessment include the duration of the stop, whether the police diligently pursue the investigation,
Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686, and whether the suspect is moved during the detention, Royer, 460 U.S.
at 504-05.
116. Traffic stops, a possible analogy, can generally last no longer than necessary to process
the citation or warning. See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 878 (10th Cir. 1994);
People v. Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275, 279 (Il1.2002).
117. Carey v. Nev. Gaming Control Bd., 279 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2002).
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suspicion."' A demand for identification obviously involves compulsion,
because a refusal, as in Nevada and under any prospective national identity
system, would involve some criminal penalty.1 9 A suspect would thus face
the choice between complying with a directive to produce her identity card
or facing arrest and prosecution.
The majority in Hiibel assumed, but did not decide, that furnishing
one's name was "testimonial" for Fifth Amendment purposes. 20 Justice
Stevens was probably correct that such an action is indeed testimonial.
The individual is saying, "XY is my name," or "ABC is my address." The
suspect is being "asked for a response requiring him to communicate an
express or implied assertion of fact or belief," and the answer, therefore,
contains a "testimonial component." '' Similarly, someone who hands over
an identity card is implicitly stating, "The information on this card pertains
to me." The communication implicit in that act of production makes
testimonial a response to a command to supply identification.'22
For Miranda purposes even where there is compelled testimony,
questions "normally attendant to arrest and custody"'2 are exempt from the
usual interrogation rules. Eight Justices have concluded that responses to
these "booking question[s]," designed to obtain biographical data for
police administrative purposes, are an exception to the Mirandarules.'24
It is somewhat surprising that the Court in Hiibeldid not consider applying
this administrative question exception to "core" Fifth Amendment
compulsion.
Instead, the Court resolved the Fifth Amendment issue by holding that
a response to an identification demand would not ordinarily be

118. Hulbel, 124 S. Ct. at 2460-61.
119. Compare Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 44-42 (1984) (holding that Miranda
warnings are not required during a traffic stop because compulsion to answer is not present). In
addition, unlike other documents whose production may later be required because they were
voluntarily and independently created, as, for example, in Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463
(1976) and UnitedStates v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984), a person presumably also would have been
compelled to participate in "creation" of the identity card.

120. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2460.
121. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 597 (1990).
122. Doe, 465 U.S. at 612; Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976). But see Fisher,
425 U.S. at 426 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Production of documentary materials created or
authenticated by a State or the Federal Government, such as automobile registrations ... would
seem ordinarily to fall outside the protection of the privilege. They hardly reflect an extension of
the person.").
123. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
124. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601-02 (holding that questions regarding name, address, height,
weight, eye color, date of birth, and age qualify as routine booking questions). Four Justices,
Rehnquist, White, Blackmun, and Stevens, considered the answers non-testimonial. Id. at 608
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) Justices Brennan, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy found the answers
to be testimonial but to constitute an exception to Miranda rules. Id. at 601.
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incriminating.'25 If an identity check produces any useful information at all,
it is likely to be the name and other data about a hitherto-unknown person
against whom evidence of a crime already exists. This is not the kind of
testimonial incrimination against which the Fifth Amendment protects.'26
The Court in Hiibel did acknowledge the possibility that in some
exceptional case revealing one's identity will constitute compelled selfincrimination.'27 But this contingency does not make identity checking
incriminating as a general matter. Importantly, because this is a casespecific question, no blanket injunction against a national identity system
on Fifth Amendment grounds would likely succeed.
Finally, even in the rare instance where an identification request
nevertheless did appear otherwise to implicate the Fifth Amendment, the
decision in Chavez v. Martinez2 ' calls into question whether a Fifth
Amendment violation would occur if the suspect's responses were never
introduced at trial. 9 If the required production of identification resulted
in compelled testimonial incrimination, under Chavez unless and until the
statements or information (or evidence derived therefrom) were used at
trial there would quite possibly be no constitutional claim. This result
would raise questions about what evidence was the fruit of the poisonous
identification; that is, what causal connection need be shown between the
compelled self-identification and the trial evidence, and to what degree
doctrines like independent source and inevitable discovery come into
play. 30 It is almost certain that identity could independently be proved at
trial and that associated data could be shown likely to have been inevitably
discovered. '

125. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2460-61; id. at 2461 ("Answering a request to disclose a name is
likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to be incriminating only in unusual
circumstances.").
126. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424,431-32 (1971) ("Disclosure of name and address is an
essentially neutral act."); see also id. at 434 ("Although identity, when made known, may lead to
inquiry that in turn leads to arrest and charge, those developments depend on different factors and
independent evidence.") (upholding California hit-and-run statute that made criminal the failure of
a driver involved in an accident to stop and give his or her name and address).
127. Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2460.
128. 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
129. See id. Justices Thomas, Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Scalia concluded that the Fifth
Amendment cannot be violated unless the evidence is actually introduced against the defendant. Id.
at 2001. Two others, Souter and Breyer, were unwilling to allow § 1983 actions for violations of
the self-incrimination clause and the "complementary" rules developed under it. Id.at 2008 (Souter,
J., concurring).
130. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539 (1988) (applying the independent source
doctrine); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,448 (1984) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not
apply to information that ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means).
131. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 477 (1980).
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In sum, identification checks during Terry stops would involve
compelled testimonial communication, but under Hiibelthey are generally
permitted. Even those few that would reveal incriminating information
would rarely lead directly to tainted, and thus suppressible, courtroom
evidence. As a general matter, the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination
clause therefore presents no meaningful barrier to required identity checks
of the already suspicious.
C. Arrests and Citations
The reasons for permitting law enforcement personnel to demand
identification from those stopped for investigation apply even more
forcefully to persons being arrested or given a traffic citation. These people
have already been seized on an allegation of probable cause,132 so a
demand for identification imposes no additional physical restraint.
Identification is generally more necessary for the processing of the arrest
or traffic citation than for an investigative stop. 3 3 An arrest will usually
lead to an arraignment on a criminal charge, and identification of the
accused is an important part of that proceeding.' 34 Before an arrestee is
released on bail, it is important to know whether or not she is wanted for
other offenses. A traffic citation also requires some assurance that the
person cited will respond or face the consequences.
The Supreme Court held in Whren v. United States that the officers'
motivation for a traffic stop is irrelevant to its reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment; in other words, a driver cannot object to being pulled
over on the ground that it is a "pretext" for the officers to perform one of
the many investigation measures attendant to a traffic stop. 3 Because

132. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) ("As a general matter, the decision to
stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic
violation has occurred."); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976) (holding that
probable cause justifies arrest).
133. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 646,640 (1983) (noting the importance of ascertaining or
verifying the arrestee's identity); Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1963)
(holding that routine identification processes are part of custodial arrest).
134. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dis. Court of Nevada, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2461 (2004) ("In every
criminal case, it ... must be known who has been arrested and who is being tried."); State v.
Marlow, 501 So. 2d 136,138 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (upholding perjury charge for giving false name
under oath at arraignment); Goodin v. State, 16 Ohio St. 344, 346 (Ohio 1865); 21 AM. JuR. 2D
CriminalLaw § 589 (2003) ("The purpose and necessity of an arraignment are to fix the identity
of the accused .. ").
135. Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769,771-72 (2001) (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 812-13)
(holding a valid traffic stop not rendered unreasonable by officers' subjective aim to search for
evidence of crime); see also David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why
"Driving While Black" Matters, 84 MiNN. L. REV. 265, 311-18 (1999).
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identification verification is always part of traffic law enforcement, 3 6
police officers could, consistent with Supreme Court precedent, pull
drivers over for the purpose of checking that identification, so long as they
had first observed a traffic violation. They would simply have to follow the
driver until she committed the moving violation, as almost all drivers
eventually do.137 None of the restraints on police discretion to target
individuals on the basis of race or other appearance-based factors that the
Supreme Court has imposed with checkpoints apply in this context. 3 ' The

136. David A. Harris, Car Wars: The Fourth Amendment's Death on the Highway, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 556, 568 (1998) ("The traffic stop gives the officer the opportunity to walk to the

driver's side window and... request[] license and registration ....
137. Id. at 559-60. Harris notes:
Vehicle codes, which exist in every state, contain an almost mind-numbing
amount of detailed regulation. There are, of course, the usual 'moving violations,'
such as speeding, failing to obey stop signs, and changing lanes without
signalling. But these violations only begin the catalog of possible offenses. There
are traffic infractions for almost every conceivable aspect of vehicle operation,
from the distance drivers must signal before turning, to the times of day and
weather conditions that require drivers to turn on their lights.
Some of these offenses are not even clearly defined, giving officers the
discretion to stop drivers who are operating vehicles in ways and under conditions
that are not 'reasonable and prudent.' If regulation of driving is pervasive, legal
requirements concerning vehicle equipment may be even more so. For example,
state traffic codes mandate the kind of lights each vehicle must have and the
distance from which these lights must be visible, the types of license plates and
regulatory stickers vehicles must carry, how loud an exhaust system may be, and
even how deep the tread on a car's tires must be.
The upshot of all this regulation is that even the most cautious driver would
find it virtually impossible to drive for even a short distance without violating
some traffic law. A police officer willing to follow any driver for a few blocks
would therefore always have probable cause to make a stop under Whren.
Id.; see also David A. Harris, "DrivingWhile Black" andAll Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme
Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544,557-58 (1997).
138. See infra text accompanying note 233. For this reason David Moran has contended that:
Atwater and Sullivan effectively rendered irrelevant the Court's other major
vehicle search case from the 2000-2001 Term, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, in
which the Court held that the police could not set up roadblocks for the primary
purpose of catching motorists transporting narcotics. If an officer may stop any car
she observes committing any traffic or equipment violation, arrest the motorist and
search the car, there is no need to set up roadblocks. Indeed, it would obviously
be much more efficient and productive for the police to single out "suspicious"
motorists, [and] stop and arrest them for trivial violations ....
David A. Moran, The New FourthAmendment Vehicle Doctrine:Stop and Search Any Car atAny
Time, 47 VlL. L. REv. 815, 832 (2002).
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history of traffic enforcement against minority motorists proves that law
enforcement 139officers are perfectly willing to take advantage of this
opportunity.
Traffic stops, therefore, present a powerful and dangerous tool for any
national identity system."4 They are powerful because with enough law
enforcement desire and effort, virtually any driver could be made to stop
and present an identity card; they are dangerous because of the unlimited
official discretion the practice allows. In the context of a national identity
system, Whren thus opened more of a Pandora's Box than the Court knew.
For this reason, statutory restraint on the use of traffic stops as a means of
identity checking should be considered as part of any national identity
scheme, though it must be acknowledged that such limitations would be
difficult to define and enforce. 4' There are, of course, legitimate reasons
to stop people for traffic violations. How could police be dissuaded from
doing so for the wrong reasons? It would'be possible, for example, to bar
identity card demands during traffic stops for certain minor infractions.
This practice might result in some missed connections to valuable data, but
it might be necessary to discourage stops made for the primary purpose of
identity checks. Official inducement to stop vehicles for minor offenses in
order to demand national identity cards would be one major disadvantage
of an extensive identity system.
D. Checkpoints
Checkpoints entail stopping all persons or vehicles (or a pre-designated
subset) passing a particular location. They are a potentially important
method of identity determination for any national identity system, both
because they could reach large numbers of people and because they could
be placed at or around sensitive locations. From an efficiency standpoint,
they do not rest on the voluntary compliance ofconsensual encounters, nor
do they depend upon the reasonable suspicion of illegal behavior required
for investigative stops. Checkpoints, in short, are both compulsory and
total in their coverage. Vehicle checkpoints have already been employed
for immigration enforcement, sobriety checking, drug interdiction, witness
identification, and other national security and law enforcement objectives,
and there is therefore a fairly substantial body of case law on their legality
under the Fourth Amendment. If a national identity system did employ
139. Harris, supra note 135, at 311-12.
140. David Frum and Richard Perle recommend using traffic stops in a national identity system
as a terrorism fighting tactic. FRUM & PERLE, supra note 2, at 71.
141. Cf U.S. Dep't of Just., supra note 82, at 3 ("IThe officer may not use race or ethnicity
as a factor in deciding which motorists to pull over."). But see id. at 5-6 ("Race and ethnicity may
be used in terrorist identification, but only to the extent permitted by the nation's laws and the
Constitution.).
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checkpoints, they would likely be applied to pedestrians as well, a use not
yet addressed by the Supreme Court.
1. Program Purpose
Forcing people, in vehicles or on foot, to stop at checkpoints constitutes
a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.'42 The question then becomes
under what circumstances such suspicionless seizures are reasonable. In
answering that question, the Supreme Court has distinguished between
checkpoints whose primary purpose is to "detect evidence of ordinary
criminal wrongdoing" and those that serve some "special needs" other than
the general interest in crime control. 43 The case creating this distinction,
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, held that a checkpoint whose primary
purpose was to apprehend persons carrying illegal drugs fell in the former
category. 44 Any checkpoint whose primary purpose is to "advance the
general interest in crime control" violates the Fourth Amendment's ban on
seizing people without some individualized indication of criminality, and
is therefore per se unreasonable.' On the other hand, checkpoints "aimed
primarily at purposes beyond the general interest in crime control"'" can
be permissible under the Fourth Amendment and tare evaluated for
below.' 4497
reasonableness on the basis of a three-pronged test discussed
4
Using this test, the Supreme Court has upheld immigration," sobriety,1
and witness-identification checkpoints. 5 ' In dicta, the Court has indicated
approval of roadblock-type stops for highway license and registration
checks,' at government buildings or airports,"' or "to thwart an imminent
terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way
of a particular route."' 53
Whether national identity system checkpoints would have as their
primary purpose the "detect[ion of] evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing"15 4 would depend, of course, on the origins and contours ofthe

142. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,40 (2000); Mich. Dep't of State Police v.
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976).
143. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37-38, 41; see also Illinois v. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. 885, 889 (2004)
(quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81 (2001).
144. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48.
145. Id. at44n.l.
146. Id. at 48.
147. See infra text accompanying notes 177-85.
148. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
149. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
150. Illinois v. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. 885 (2004).
151. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
152. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48-49.
153. Id. at44.
154. Id. at38.
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program, but it seems unlikely that general crime detection would be the
primary purpose of such a system. Given the deep-seated societal
reluctance to adopt a national identity card, it would probably be put into
use only if there were a substantial threat to national security, possibly in
the form of more terrorist attacks. If so, the likely purpose would be the
prevention of further attacks. While such attacks would obviously be
serious crimes, the fact that the harm is also the subject of the criminal law
would not necessarily keep these checkpoints from serving a
predominantly "non-criminal" purpose. The immigration checkpoints in
Martinez-Fuerteand the drunk driving roadblocks in Sitz sought to prevent
harms (the presence of undocumented aliens and inebriated drivers) that
are also the object of criminal penalties.'55
On the other hand, it could be argued that "terrorism" encompasses a
variety of crimes and, indeed, is just crime with a particular motivation
and/or target. 5 6 Anti-terrorism identification checkpoints would stretch the
rationale of "special needs" or "non-criminal purpose" searches to its
current limit, but it is likely that courts would find their use to be
distinguishable from general crime fighting, particularly in the face of the
enormous public pressures that would probably lie behind their creation. 57
'
Lower courts that have considered the permissibility of checkpoints on
open military bases in the wake of Edmond have upheld the practice,
distinguishing national security protection from society's general interest
in crime control.""
The recent decision in Illinois v. Lidster59 provides little support for a
"non-criminal" characterization of identity checkpoints. Lidster involved
a checkpoint set up by local police to find witnesses to a hit-and-run
accident in which a bicyclist was struck and killed by an unknown
driver."6 The checkpoint was located at the accident scene and set up at
roughly the same time of day as the accident, about a week later. 6 Police
62
cars partially blocked the highway, forcing the traffic to slow to a stop.
When the vehicles stopped at the checkpoint, an officer asked the
occupants for information about the accident and gave them a flyer

155. Id. at 48-56.

156. On the varying definitions of terrorism, see, e.g., James A.R. Nafziger, The Grave New
World of Terrorism: A Lawyer's View, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 8-10 (2002).

157. Indeed, if the Supreme Court found itself unable to classify prevention of terrorism as a
"special need," it would, I suspect, abandon Edmond before it would strike down suspicionless
identity checks under a legislatively established national identity system.
158. United States v. Green, 293 F.3d 855,859 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Hawkins, 249
F.3d 867, 873 (9th Cir. 2001).
159. 124 S. CL 885 (2004).
160. Id.
161. Id."
162. Id
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requesting assistance. 163 As he approached the checkpoint, Lidster almost
hit one of the checkpoint officers, was stopped, failed a field sobriety test,
and was eventually convicted of driving under the influence.'"
Invoking Edmond, the Illinois Supreme Court held the checkpoint to
have a criminal investigative purpose and therefore to require
individualized suspicion. 16 The United States Supreme Court unanimously
rejected this conclusion.'" In contrast to the checkpoints in Edmond, it
concluded the primary purpose here was not to find evidence about the
stopped vehicle's occupants, but about someone else. 67 The object may be
"criminal" in some sense, but the stop was not personal. 6 Furthermore,
69
the concept of individualized suspicion does not apply to this practice.
This kind of "information-seeking stop," the Court held, was not what it
had in mind in its earlier condemnation of checkpoints aimed at crime
control.' 70
While checkpoints associated with a national identity system could
certainly be described as "information-seeking," the information in most
cases would be employed against the individual who was stopped.
Moreover, unlike a single checkpoint designed to locate witnesses to a
particular, non-recurring act of criminality, checkpoints in a national
identity system would probably have no designated target (or would have
many) and would likely be quite numerous and widespread. Thus, the
question of whether they would serve society's interest in crime control or
some other purpose would not be settled by Lidster's
verdict on the
7'
considered.'
it
checkpoint
unusual,
and
particular,
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. People v. Lidster, 202 11. 2d 1, 4-9 (III. 2002).
166. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. at 888.
167. Id. at 889.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. For some reason, the Court went on to rely on several features of "informationseeking" checkpoints that relate not to their purpose but to their intrusiveness, such as the fact that
there is a lesser expectation of privacy in vehicles, that checkpoint stops are brief and not
particularly frightening, and that they are unlikely to be used extensively. Id. at 889-90. These
considerations, if true, are usually applied to the question of the reasonablenessof a checkpoint
scheme that has already been found to serve a non-criminal purpose. See infra textaccompanying
note 177. There is thus an ominously circular quality to the Court's analysis in Lidster.
171. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. at 889. On the other hand, checkpoints set up to apprehend terrorism
suspects in a known event in a particular area--around Oklahoma City in the wake of the Murrah
Building explosion, for example--would draw support from Lidster's precedent for investigative
roadblocks, bringing us closer to Justice Jackson's well known argument for a Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence keyed to the gravity of the offense:
If we assume, for example, that a child is kidnaped and the officers throw a
roadblock about the neighborhood and search every outgoing car, it would be a
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Congress could virtually insulate identity checkpoints from an Edmond
challenge by making immigration enforcement its major, if not primary,
purpose. Emphasizing the importance of border control, the prevalence of
illegal alien presence in the United States, and the difficulty of interdicting
those from Mexico, the Supreme Court in Martinez-Fuerte upheld a
challenge to vehicle roadblocks, each located approximately sixty-five
miles from the Mexican border in California and Texas. 7 2 The Edmond
Court was careful to distinguish and preserve Martinez-Fuerte,invoking
again the special need to police the border.'73 Checkpoints under a national
identity system would likely be distributed around the country and would
not necessarily be located within a short drive of an international border as
in Martinez-Fuerte."4 They would, in all likelihood, be designed to
identify not only illegal border crossers from Mexico but also any noncitizens unlawfully present in the United States. 75 A broader-gauged
immigration focus would not, however, convert the checkpoints' purpose
to one of general law enforcement. In short, checkpoints whose principal
purpose is the identification and apprehension of noncitizens illegally
present in the United States certainly fall outside of Edmond's limited ban
on suspicionless checkpoint seizures. They are thus evaluated for
reasonableness under a three-factor analysis.' 76
2. Reasonableness Determination
For checkpoints whose primary purpose is not general law enforcement,
the Supreme Court determines reasonableness (and thus compliance with
the Fourth Amendment) using a three-pronged balancing test. The Court
balances 1) the government's interest in preventing the relevant harm, 2)
drastic and undiscriminating use of the search. The officers might be unable to
show probable cause for searching any particular car. However, I should candidly
strive hard to sustain such an action, executed fairly and in good faith, because it

might be reasonable to subject travelers to that indignity if it was the only way to
save a threatened life and detect a vicious crime. But I should not strain to sustain
such a roadblock and universal search to salvage a few bottles of bourbon and

catch a bootlegger.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
172. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545-52 (1976).
173. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 38-40, 47 (2000).

174. A national identity system that relied on identification checkpoints might also differ from
the Martinez-Fuerteroadblocks by its use with pedestrian as well as vehicle traffic. This difference
would not seem to have any bearing on whether the checkpoint was for general criminal
enforcement rather than for immigration control, however, though it might affect the balancing used
to determine their legality. See infra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
175. See infra notes 180-85 and accompanying text for a description of the nature of the
problem and the need for checkpoints as a means to combat it.
176. See infra text accompanying note 177.
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the extent to which the checkpoint system can be said to advance that
interest, and 3) the degree of intrusion on those persons who are stopped. 77
The following subsections discuss how this balance might apply to
checkpoints employed in a national identity system.
a. Interest in Prevention
In assessing the degree of the problem it addressed, much would turn
on the circumstances behind national identity checkpoints and the aims
they were designed to achieve. It is hard to imagine, for example, that
prevention of identity theft or election fraud, or the need to assure that
government benefits are delivered correctly, would count as substantial
government interests for widespread identity checkpoints. On the other
hand, as indicated above, a national identity system directed at a real and
present danger of terrorist attacks or the illegal presence of millions of
noncitizens would almost certainly suffice. In Sitz, the Court measured the
magnitude of the drunk driving problem by its annual death and personal
injury toll and amount of property damage." 8 In the period after September
11 th, there would have been no question about the scope and seriousness
of the threat of domestic attack. The absence of additional attacks thus far
would probably not reduce significantly the governmental interest, though,
particularly in light of the subsequent apprehension and conviction of
several people for supporting or planning terrorist activity, as well as the
elevated threat levels during the past two years. 79

177. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,455 (1990); see also Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. at 555; Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).
178. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451 (citing 25,000 deaths, one million personal injuries, and five billion
dollars in property damage per year).
179. The threat levels since September 10, 2002 follow:
Dates

ThreatLevel

9/10/02

9/24/02

2/7/03

2/27/03

3/17/03

4/16/03

5/20/03

5/30/03

12/21/03

to

to

tO

to

to

tO

tO

to

to

9/24/02

217/03

2/27/03

3/17/03

4/16/03

5/20/03

5/30/03

12/21/03

1/9/04

Orange

Yellow

Orange

Yellow

Orange

Yellow

Ornge

Yellow

Orange

U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, Compilation of Indexed Press Releases at
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/themehome8.jsp (last visited Mar. 28, 2004). Yellow denotes an
"Elevated Condition," declared when there is a significant risk of terrorist attacks, while orange is
a "High Condition," declared when there is a high risk of terrorist attacks. U.S. Dep't of Homeland
Security, HomelandSecurityAdvisorySystem, at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublicldisplay?theme=29
(last visited Mar. 28, 2004); see also Ellmann, supra note 82, at 683 ("[P]reventing terrorism
presents an especiallycompelling governmental interest.... Terrorism is a danger to huge numbers
of people, and perhaps to the nation itself, in a way that each individual crime of violence can
hardly ever be.").
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As for immigration enforcement, what the Court said in 1976 of
Martinez-Fuerteis still true: despite (or perhaps because of) the national
policy to limit immigration, "large numbers of aliens seek illegally to enter
or to remain in the United States." 80 What is different now is that a much
smaller percentage of undocumented migrants than Martinez-Fuerte's
estimate of 85% are from Mexico. 8 ' Also, comparatively more
undocumented migrants are now likely to have overstayed their visas than
to have entered the country surreptitiously.8 2 Visa overstayers can be
anywhere in the country, pointing toward a greater necessity of
enforcement activity in the nation's interior.
Unlawful alien presence is not an unmitigated harm, and the costs and
benefits are subject to vigorous debate. 8' The undocumented population
was assumed to be a serious national problem in Martinez-Fuerte,
however, and Congress would certainly be entitled to find it to be one in
the course of creating an immigration-focused national identity system.'
Moreover, to the extent that a terrorism threat comes from persons who are
not U.S. citizens, especially those who are here without permission, the
governmental interests in preventing terrorist attacks and illegal

180. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 551. The Court mentioned a possible 10-12 million aliens

illegally in the country. Id.
181. See Eduardo Porter, Illegal Immigrants May Total 8.5 Million, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14,
2001, at A4 (estimating that 4.5 million of 8.5 million undocumented migrants, or 53%, are from
Mexico), cited in STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 1112 (3d
ed. 2002). However, "[tihe large majority, over 80 percent, of all undocumented immigrants are
from.., the Western Hemisphere." T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENsHIP 601 (4th ed. 1998).
182. About 41% of the total undocumented population in 1996 were "overstays" who entered
legally on temporary visas but failed to leave. ALEINIKOFF, ET AL., supra note 181, at 601. The
percentage may be increasing. See Nafziger, supranote 156, at 6 ("For many foreign visitors, visa
overstaying has become the immigration procedure of choice.").
183. For a discussion of the several ways of measuring the impact and summaries of,and some
selection from, the vast literature on the subject, see ALENIKOFF, ETAL., supranote 181, at 610-20;
LEGOMSKY, supra note 181, at 1111-13. For a more anecdotal account, see ERIC SCHLOSSER,
REEFER MADNESS: SEX, DRUGS, AND CHEAP LABOR INTHE AMERICAN BLACK MARKET 75-108
(2003) (describing costs and benefits of undocumented agricultural labor).
184. This is particularly so because ofCongress's traditional plenary power over immigration.
See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952). The scope of this doctrine, and
the extent to which it still exists, are the subject of long-standing debate. See, e.g., T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, DetainingPlenaryPower: The Meaning and Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 362 (2002); Peter J.
Spiro, Explainingthe End ofPlenaryPower,16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
339 (2002). Whatever its contours, deference to a Congressional conclusion that unlawful
immigration is a serious problem would seem to be an unexceptionably mild use of the doctrine.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol56/iss4/1

34

Steinbock: National Identity Cards: Fourth and Fifth Amendment Issues

NA77ONAL IDENTI7Y CARDS: FOURTHAND FIFTH AMENDMENT ISSUES

immigration converge."8 5 All of this suggests that the nature of the illegal
immigration problem may have changed in the twenty-five years since
Martinez-Fuerte, but its severity can be seen as undiminished, if not
actually increased.
b. Effectiveness
The second factor in the balance, the extent to which checkpoints
advance the identified interest, also depends on the problem or problems
the checkpoints are designed to address. Let us assume that these are
prevention of terrorist attack and mitigation of illegal alien presence, or
some combination of the two. Checkpoint effectiveness can be measured
in several different ways: 1) the absolutenumber of suspects apprehended,
2) the rate of apprehensions (the number of suspects divided by the
number of individuals stopped), or 3) the relative effectiveness of
checkpoints compared to other methods of prevention and enforcement.
The Supreme Court has considered all three outcomes in evaluating
checkpoints, though not in any systematic way.8 6 The following discussion
applies these measures to hypothetical immigration and anti-terrorism
identification checkpoints.
As noted above, the country and the Court already have substantial
experience with immigration checkpoints in the form of roadblocks on
major highways leading from the Mexican border."8 7 The San Clemente
checkpoint, located sixty-six miles north of the Mexican border on
Interstate 5, the principal highway between San Diego and Los Angeles,
resulted in the apprehension of 17,000 undocumented aliens in 1973.188 In
fiscal year 2000, the San Clemente and Temecula checkpoints in California
produced slightly fewer than 10,000 arrests.' 89 In absolute terms, then,
highway checkpoints can be quite effective, at least when they straddle a
well-traveled Interstate in the vicinity of the border, though the decline in
the number of arrests is worthy of note.
Of greater concern, however, is that the San Clemente checkpoint relied
on referring some motorists for a three-to-five-minute "secondary

185. On the pros and cons of using immigration enforcement as a weapon against terrorism,
see, for example, DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS 1-85, 183-209 (2003); Victor C. Romero,
Decoupling "Terrorist"from "Immigrant":An EnhancedRole for the FederalCourts Post9/11,
7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 201, 202-06 (2003); see also FRUM & PERLE, supra note 2, at 68.
186. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
188. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976). The Court's projection of
the data over one year,based-on the eight days of operation at issue in the case, was 33,000 arrests.
Id.
189. Press Release, United States Border Patrol San Diego Sector (Sept. 13, 2000) (on file
with author).
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inspection," at which they would be questioned about their citizenship or
immigration status.'" These referrals, the Court assumed, "are made
largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry."' 9 It is hard to see how
secondary referrals would work outside of the factual context of the
Mexican border. Could other ethnic groups be pulled aside for secondary
inspection on the basis of their "apparent [fill in] ancestry"? Putting aside
the indignity of this of ethnic targeting,'92 it is wildly inefficient. Under a
national identity system, however, presumably, every person would have
to present a national identity card to verify lawful presence in the United
States. Further detention and more thorough questioning would be
necessary only for those who lacked proof of citizenship or lawful
presence.
This means of "secondary" inspection thus eliminates the discretionary
and profiling aspects of the current form of immigration checkpoints.193 It
does, to some degree, however, correspondingly increase the
inconvenience for everyone.' 94 Moreover, the discretionary aspects of
checkpoint placement would, presumably, remain, raising the possibility
of placement in ethnically selected target areas. While perhaps legal, this
tactic would be profoundly unwise, creating, as it would, apartheid-type
enclaves subject to internal border controls.
Measuring rate of success, the ratio between the number of persons
stopped and the number apprehended, is certainly an important factor in
the reasonableness balance.' 95 Existing checkpoints impact an enormous
number of vehicles, and the success rate is relatively low. In MartinezFuerte the Court found that .12% (or 12 of every 10,000) vehicles
contained deportable aliens.' 96 In Sitz it approved a 1.6% success rate for

190. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 546-47.
191. Id. at 563. The dissent in Martinez-Fuertefocused most of its ire on this aspect of the
immigration roadblocks: "Every American citizen of Mexican ancestry and every Mexican alien
lawfully in this country must know after today's decision that he travels the fixed checkpoint
highways at the risk of being subjected not only to a stop, but also to detention and interrogation."
Id. at 572 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
192. Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78
WASH. U. L.Q. 675, 711-16, 726-28 (2000).
193. DERSHowrrz, supranote 2, at 203 (national identity card eliminatesjustification for racial
and ethnic profiling). Use of the card would be analogous to the requirement that all prospective
employees present proof of citizenship or other work authorization, regardless of their appearance,
attire, or "native" English speech. See Immigration and Nationality Act, § 274A(a)(l)(B), 8 U.S.C.

§ 1324a(a)(l)(B) (2000).
194. See infra text accompanying notes 218-36.
195. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659-60 (1979) (striking down random motor vehicle
license and registration checks as unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment).
196. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 445 (1990) (citing Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. at 554).
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sobriety checkpoints.' 97 While the Court has upheld immigration
enforcement roadblocks with a miniscule rate of success, more general use
of checkpoints would probably test even those numerical limits. On the
other hand, the Court in Sitz explicitly cautioned the judiciary against a
"searching examination" of checkpoint effectiveness. 9 '
The success rate of a national identity system designed to discover
undocumented migrants is integrally tied to the third method of assessing
effectiveness: relative effectiveness compared to other methods of
prevention and enforcement. In other words, are checkpoints effective and
necessary compared to available alternatives? The Court accepted
roadblocks on major highways leading from the border in Martinez-Fuerte
partly because "the flow of illegal aliens cannot be controlled effectively
at the border" itself.'" If roadblocks were used throughout the country,
they would probably catch additional undocumented aliens, particularly if
they were set up at other restricted-access transportation routes or nodes.
It is likely, however, that such checkpoints would have an even lower
success rate than those in the border region because of the lesser
concentration of undocumented aliens away from border areas. While
checkpoints also could be used for pedestrian traffic, these would often be
easy to circumvent. Pedestrian checkpoints could be avoided unless they
were mobile enough that the undocumented migrants were taken by
surprise, or the checkpoints were situated so that there was no way around
them. If these speculations are correct, the more widespread checkpoints
become, and the more they are used against pedestrians, the lower their
success rate is likely to be, though the total numbers of apprehended aliens
would rise.2"'
With relative effectiveness, too, the Court urges deference to
governmental preferences. "[F]or purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis,
the choice among . . . reasonable alternatives remains with the
governmental officials who have a unique understanding of, and a

197. Id. (noting that nationally, sobriety checkpoints result in drunk driving arrests of 1% of
motorists stopped). But see id at 461 (reporting a 0.3% success rate at 125 Maryland checkpoints).
The difference between the Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz balancing test and the Edmond primary
purpose test is illustrated by the fact that the Indianapolis drug enforcement roadblock's 9% rate
of producing arrests for some offense, drug related or not, was irrelevant under the latter approach.
See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 35 (2000).
198. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453-54 (holding that the effectiveness evaluation is "not meant to
transfer from politically accountable officials to the courts the decision as to which among
reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques should be employed to deal with a serious public

danger").
199. _Martinez-Fuerte,428-U.S.-at 556. The dissent in Sitz saw-this as an-important distinction
between immigration and sobriety checkpoints. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 471-72 & n.15 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
200. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453.
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responsibility for, limited public resources . *...,"'0'
Moreover, parties
objecting to checkpoints have the burden of proving that "the particular
law enforcement needs served by checkpoints could be met without
reliance on routine checkpoint stops."2 2
Despite the passage since 1976 of numerous immigration law
amendments designed to discourage illegal entry and presence, including
employer sanctions, expedited removal, new inadmissibility grounds,
restrictions on public benefits, and enhanced border enforcement,2 °3 the
continued presence ofmillions of undocumented immigrants makes it hard
to imagine that a court would find checkpoints relatively unnecessary. 2"
This is true even though checkpoints are no panacea for illegal
immigration. They are as likely to drive the undocumented further
underground--off thoroughfares and locations where checkpoints may be
placed-as to greatly increase apprehensions. On the other hand, this
possibility, in turn, conceivably could have some deterrent effect by adding
one more burden to illegal presence in the United States." 5 On balance, an

201. Id. at 453-54.
202. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 557 n.12.
203. See generallyLEGOMSKY, supra note 181, at 1109-17; U.S. Commission on Immigration
Reform, US. Immigration Policy: Restoring Credibility, 9-179 (1994). The southwest border
separating the United States from Mexico has been the focus of recent national efforts to deter
illegal immigration by beefing up border patrol. Although the initiatives have resulted in higher
apprehension numbers in particular areas where the INS directed its resources, it is not clear
whether these efforts resulted in decreasing the overall number of immigrants entering the U.S.
illegally via the southwest border. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, INS' Southwest BorderStrategy:
Resource andImpact Issues Remain After Seven Years, GAO-01-842 (Aug. 2001). Until recently,
apprehensions along the southwest border continued to increase. Id. at 10. Since that General
Accounting Office (GAO) report was issued, however, Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) statistics show a decrease in apprehensions, which may be partly attributable to a decline in
attempted entries following September 11, 2001. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Servs.,
Southwest Border Apprehensions at http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statisistics/msrep01/
swbord.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2004). In fiscal year 2001, statistics showed an unusually large
decrease of 25% in apprehensions as compared to fiscal year 2000. Id.
They decreased another 25%
for fiscal year 2002. 2002 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Enforcement, at 173 availableathttp://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/ENF2002.pdf.
For the first nine months of fiscal year 2003, apprehensions at the southwest border continued on
a downward trend, dropping 5% as compared to the same period of time in fiscal year 2002. Id.
204. In Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556, the Court held that "maintenance of a trafficchecking program in the interior is necessary because the flow of illegal aliens cannot be controlled
effectively at the border." Indeed, dissenting in Sitz, 496 U.S. at 472, Justice Stevens differentiated
immigration checkpoints from sobriety roadblocks on the ground that the former produce
"thousands of otherwise impossible arrests."
205. Mark Krikorian, Bush Bill Would Aid Mexico's Meddling in US., NEWSDAY, Feb. 18,
2004, at A27 ("Making life difficult for illegal aliens is one important part of any successful effort
to prevent illegal immigration."). Surprisingly, in upholding checkpoints, Supreme Court majorities
have not chosen to rely on their deterrent effect, which, while not measurable statistically, certainly
exists to some degree. Justice Stevens' dissent in Sitz, 496 U.S. at 470-71, does speak approvingly
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expanded use of checkpoints to enforce the immigration laws in
conjunction with a national identity card would seem to pass the
"effectiveness" threshold ofthe current Fourth Amendment balancing test.
To the extent that checkpoints would be employed to identify potential
terrorists other than undocumented aliens, the various measures of efficacy
come out differently. Presumably, checkpoints would be used either to
catch individuals already identified as terrorism suspects or to single out
previously unknown persons who met some kind of terrorist profile."° The
closest current analogy to the latter method is the CAPPS system used to
screen airline passengers.20 7 What effects would follow if checkpoints
similar to those used at airports were installed in other public spaces?
Preventing terrorism is certainly a powerful national goal,2"' but it
seems likely that the absolute number of suspects apprehended through
extensive identification checkpoints would be very small, and the success
rate would be miniscule."° To begin with, the number of terrorism
suspects seems to be tiny, and the group of those who are not also in the
United States illegally is even smaller. Moreover, given what a crude
instrument terrorist profiling is, the likelihood of mistaken "hits" is
substantial. Indeed, though statistics are not available, anecdotal reports
suggest that false positives-the singling out of innocent travelers-occur
fairly regularly under the present version of CAPPS 0 and are a concern

of the possibility that sobriety checkpoints might deter drunk driving, while noting the absence of
data on the issue. "There is, obviously, nothing wrong with a law enforcement technique that
reduces crime by pure deterrence without punishing anybody; on the contrary, such an approach
is highly commendable." Id. at 471 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For an example of an immigration
enforcement effort that caused some undocumented immigrants to depart the United States on their
own, see Susan Sachs, US. Crackdown Sets Off Unusual Rush to Canada,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25,
2003, at Al (reporting that Pakistanis unlawfully in U.S. fled to Canada rather than undergo special
registration).
206. The latter effort is designed to address the problem that potential terrorists "have no
visible markers." David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REv. 953, 985 (2002).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
208. See supra text accompanying note 179.
209. See Ellmann, supra note 82, at 699-700 & nn.65-70, for an attempt to estimate the
number of Al Qaeda terrorists within the United States and the relative hit rate of a program that
tried to profile them. Recognizing that "we simply do not know what the true number [of such
terrorists] is" and that no profile is completely accurate, he assumes that a hit rate of even I in
10,000 would be a "plausible basis for action." Id. at 699-700 nn.65-66. He also notes that a
profiling program's effect in deterring attacks adds to the measure of its usefulness. Id. at 699 n.63.
For a discussion of racial profiling's effectiveness, see DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE:
WHY RAcIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK 73-87 (2002).
210. See supra text accompanying note 55.
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in the design of CAPPS 11.211 In short, the rate of success would likely be
relatively low and the rate of error relatively high.
In theory at least, the more information available to terrorist profiling
software like CAPPS, the greater the chances for accurate prediction. This
premise produces the paradox that the more intrusive the data collection
and retention, the greater its effectiveness is likely to be. 212 Thus, from the
point of view of efficacy, tying a national identity card to as many
databases as possible is a good thing. Obviously, however, this tactic
encourages the collection and storage of more and more personal data and
the linking of identity cards to greater numbers of databases, leading to a
greater potential impact on privacy and a corresponding diminution of
anonymity.
With respect to the usefulness of other alternatives, much depends on
the circumstances that would prompt widespread use of identification
checkpoints. Since September 11th, the federal government has enacted
and assumed a wide range of powers to protect domestic security. The best
known is the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001,213 but there are a host of others,
including the creation of special military tribunals and the indefinite
detention of unlawful combatants.214 It is hard to know just how effective
they have been, both because the government releases scant information
about its anti-terrorism activities 25 and because no one really knows the
extent of the threat. In light of the deference given by the Court to the
political choice of crime prevention methods and the additional deference
accorded the government in protecting national security and preventing
terrorism, 216 if checkpoints were deployed in the wake ofanother domestic

211. See Wald, supra note 55 ("The goal of Capps 11, the department [of Homeland Security]
says, is to 'significantly reduce the number of passengers who are misidentified as potential threats
to passenger or airline security ....').
212. Hence the controversy over the number and kinds of data sources that CAPPS II will tap
into and the uses that will be made of them. See Wald, supranote 55 (reporting a reduction in both
the scope of information collected on air travelers and on the use of credit and medical records).
213. Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (2001).
214. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, THE ENEMY WrTHINpassim (2002) (summarizing

steps taken to identify and apprehend terrorists within the United States); Sean D. Murphy,
ContemporaryPracticeofthe UnitedStates Relating to InternationalLaw, 96 AM. J. INT'LL. 237,
238-43 (2002); Andrew E. Taslitz, Terrorism and the Citizenry's Safety, 17 CRIM. JUST. 4, 4-5
(2002).
215. Amy Goldstein, Fierce Fight Over Secrecy, Scope of Law, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2003
at Al (reporting that the USA PATRIOT Act bans disclosures about its use, and there is little
information publicly available about its effectiveness).
216. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001) (referring to the "heightened
deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of national security");
Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (upholding
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attack, it seems highly unlikely that the judiciary would find other
alternatives to be so effective as to render checkpoints constitutionally
unreasonable.
c. Degree of Intrusion
The third factor in the Supreme Court's assessment of roadblocks has
been the degree of intrusion experienced by affected motorists. The Court
speaks in terms of "objective" and "subjective" intrusions, with
"objective" referring to physical interference with movement and
"subjective" referring to concern or fright caused to those stopped by the
roadblock.217 In the cases involving immigration and sobriety checkpoints,
the Court has not found either form of intrusion particularly weighty.
The "objective" intrusion obviously depends on how a checkpoint is
operated. Hypothetical checkpoints under a national identity system would
most likely involve stopping each motorist or pedestrian, demanding
presentation of his or her identity card, and swiping the card through a
reader linked with computerized records.21 The individual effectively
would be detained both while this occurred and pending the electronic
reply from the database. If this sequence of events took no longer than an
ordinary credit card authorization, it is doubtful the Court would find the
the Department of Justice's refusal to release the names of persons detained in the wake of
September I I attacks and granting deference to governmental assessment of the impact on national
security: "America faces an enemyjust as real as its former Cold War foes, with capabilities beyond
the capacity of the judiciary to explore."); Samuel Issacharoff& Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil
LibertarianismandExecutive Unilateralism:An InstitutionalProcessApproach to Rights During
Wartime, 5 Theoretical Inquiries in L. 1, 2 (2004) availableat http://www.bepress.comltilldefaultl
vol5/iss1/artl ("Times of heightened risk to the physical safety of their citizens inevitably cause
democracies to recalibrate their institutions and processes and to reinterpret existing legal norms,
with greater emphasis on security, and less on individual liberty, than in normal times."). Oren
Gross notes that:
Notwithstanding statements about the courts' role in safeguarding human rights
and civil liberties precisely when those rights and liberties are most at risk, when
faced with national crises, the judiciary tends to 'go to war.' . . . [I]n states of
emergency, national courts assume a highly deferential attitude when called upon
to review governmental actions and decisions.
Oren Gross, Chaos andRules: ShouldResponses to Violent CrisesAlways Be Constitutional?,112
YALE L.J. 10 11, 1034 (2003). But see David Cole, Judgingthe Next Emergency: JudicialReview
and IndividualRights in Times of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2565, 2566 (2003) ("[Jludicial review
of emergency and national-security measures can and has established important constraints on the
exercise of emergency powers and has restricted the scope of what is acceptable in future
emergencies.").
217. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451-53 (1990); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558-59 (1976).
218. See supra text accompanying notes 10-17, 45-46.
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objective intrusion to differ significantly from that of immigration or
sobriety checkpoints, for which the Court has characterized the objective
intrusion as quite "limited"2 9 and "slight."22 A "positive" response to the
identity check, in the form of an outstanding warrant, an indication of
unlawful presence in the United States, or some other adequate ground, can
justify further detention, but that additional seizure must have its own
independent basis.22 ' In fact, the use of terrorist profiling raises separate
Fourth Amendment issues of how much indication of terrorist potential, as
revealed at the identification checkpoint, would be necessary to justify
taking measures against a person, be it delayed or denied air travel,
additional questioning or search, or even arrest.222
Even for checkpoint stops that do not result in a "hit," the process could
easily cause people to be detained or delayed to an extent that would weigh
heavily against the practice. The average delay occasioned by the sobriety
checkpoints in Sitz was approximately twenty-five seconds,223 but
checkpoints requiring an individual to remove an identity card from her
pocket or purse, to have it read, and then to await clearance would
probably take considerably longer. This would be particularly true if the
database scan took some length of time. Moreover, anyone who has passed
through airport security since September 11,2001, knows that checkpoints
can produce long waiting lines, interfering significantly with free passage.
Any of these entirely likely possibilities would significantly increase the

219. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 557-58.
The stop does intrude to a limited extent on motorists' right to 'free passage
without interruption, and arguably on their right to personal security. But it
involves only a brief detention of travelers during which [a]ll that is required of
the vehicle's occupants is a response to a brief question or two and possibly the
production of a document evidencing a right to be in the United States.
Id. (alteration in original; internal quotations and citations omitted).
220. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451; Illinois v. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. 885, 891 (2004).
221. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808 (1996); supra text accompanying notes
191-93 (seconda.y inspections); cf. Bob Herbert, JailingImmigrants,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2003,
at Al 7 (describing the lawful, if unnecessary, detention of an alien after a computer check following
a traffic stop revealed his undocumented status).
222. Unless the law of search and arrest is going to be drastically revamped for terrorism
suspects, the answers would seem to be the usual measures of reasonable suspicion for investigative
stops, Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 269 (2000), and probable cause for extended detention,
Dunawayv.New York, 442 U.S 200,216 (1979). Treating persons identified by a terrorism profile
as unlawful combatants would obviously negate some of these rules. See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352
F.3d 695, 698 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding in part that Congressional authorization is required, pursuant
to the Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000), for detention of American citizens on
American soil).
223. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 448.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol56/iss4/1

42

Steinbock: National Identity Cards: Fourth and Fifth Amendment Issues

NATIONAL IDENTITY CARDS: FOURTH AND FIFTHAMENDMENT ISSUES

objective intrusion and distinguish identity checkpoints from those
roadblocks upheld by the Supreme Court so far.
Their "subjective" intrusion can also be seen as greater than that of
current immigration and sobriety checkpoints. In one way, an identification
checkpoint would be less intimidating, because the checking would be
limited to asking for a clearly designated piece of identification. This
process would be much less open-ended than looking for signs of
intoxication, for example, at sobriety checkpoints. Fear of facing unknown
questions on unknown topics would thereby be reduced (assuming the
officers stationed at the checkpoints restricted themselves to inspecting the
identification card). Although the Court has yet to consider pedestrian
checkpoints, it seems unlikely that it would find them more invasive than
vehicle checkpoints as a general matter.224 In fact, being forced to stop
while on foot is in some ways less startling, and certainly less dangerous,
than encountering a roadblock by car.225
Being checked against a database is probably much more frightening,
though, than the checkpoint screening in Martinez-Fuerteor Sitz, even for
an innocent person. 226 The individual has no way of knowing the contents
of the database against which their identification is being run, whether
these contents are accurate or not, or what further impositions might be
triggered by the information linked to their identity card. This uncertainty
will turn every identification demand into cause for apprehension.
The purpose of the checkpoint matters less, perhaps, in terms of "fear
' than whether the checkpoint is anticipated or not. Clearly,
and surprise"227
there will be more fright for even an innocent traveler 28 on encountering
an unexpected demand to show identification than from a permanent
checkpoint akin to an airport security gate.229 Even so, the Court upheld
temporary checkpoints in Sitz. 230 Nevertheless, this distinction is not
224. At one point in Martinez-Fuerte,the Court adverted to the general principle of lesser
expectation of privacy in automobiles, 428 U.S. at 561, but, in the context of the entire case, the
holding does not seem to turn on this factor. In Lidster, 124 S. Ct. at 890, the Court recently
intimated that informationalpedestrian checkpoints, at least, are less intrusive than vehicular ones,
in that the former can be conducted in a voluntary, consensual manner while the latter necessarily
involve a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
225. On the other hand, the individual lacks the protective shell of his or her automobile.
226. Normally, the Supreme Court only accounts for the reaction of a reasonable innocent
person when determining Fourth Amendment issues. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,
438 (1991); see also Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Devicefor Protectingthe

Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1229 (1983).
227. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451.

228. "Fear and surprise" relate to the "innocent," law-abiding traveler and not the trepidation
produced in a person who fears legitimate apprehension at the checkpoint. Id. at 451-52.
229. Id. at 463 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("A driver who discovers an unexpected checkpoint
on a familiar local road will be startled and distressed.").

230. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 447.
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insignificant, and checkpoints at permanent, known locations do carry less
of a subjective impact.
Identification checkpoints, it may be argued, have an additional
subjective effect on a grand scale: the psychic harm to free people of
having to "show your papers," even if only at certain designated
locations.2 1' Not only would people forced to go through identity
checkpoints experience some degree of fear and surprise, but also knowing
that this has become a permanent part of the social fabric would diminish
their sense of liberty. 23 2 This feeling is not mitigated-indeed, it may be
enhanced-by the knowledge that other people are also being stopped and
asked for identification.233 Supreme Court majorities have not yet taken
this subjective effect into account, and they may never do so, but it is
certainly real even if it cannot be quantitatively measured.
Finally, the degree of intrusion must be considered in light of its
frequency. In its evaluation ofthe burden imposed by highway roadblocks,
the Court has tended to describe and consider the interference with one
individual's freedom. The more relevant fact in passing on the
reasonableness of a methodology that depends on stopping everyone,
however, is the collective burden. 234 This imposition is a function of the
intrusiveness of each individual stop, multiplied by the number of stops the
system will entail. Looked at this way-admittedly, an approach the
majority of the Court has avoided-national identity card checkpoints
carry a very high cost. If a national identity system were to involve
checkpoints at all, it would likely require lots of them. Otherwise, there
would be little point in having them; the few that would exist could be
easily circumvented. Thousands upon thousands of people would

231. See, e.g., Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659,662 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J.) (referring
to checkpoints as "methods of policing that are associated with totalitarian nations").
232. Cf Andrew E. Taslitz, The FourthAmendment in the Twenty-FirstCentury: Technology,
Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 LAw & CON'EMP. PROBS. 125, 131 (2002) (arguing for an
"affective" definition of privacy that takes into account people's emotional reactions to
surveillance).
233. But see United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894-95 (1975) ("At traffic checkpoints the

motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers'
authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion."). Ortiz is cited
in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976).

234. The dissents in Martinez-Fuerteand Sitz did pay some attention to the collective effects
of highway roadblocks. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 571 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[Clheckpoints ...detain thousands of motorists, a dragnet-like procedure offensive to the
sensibilities of free citizens."); Sitz, 496 U.S. at 472 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing sobriety
checkpoints as "a program that produces only a handful of arrests which would be more easily
obtained without resort to suspicionless seizures of hundreds of innocent citizens"); cf Anthony
G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 367 (1974)

(contrasting the "atomistic" view of the Fourth Amendment as a protection for isolated individuals
with a conception of the Fourth Amendment as a regulator ofgovernmental conduct as a whole).
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experience recurring delays and some degree of distress in connection with
the number of checkpoints likely in any national identity system that used
them. This level of use is vastly different from the few fixed checkpoints
in the vicinity of the Mexican border,235 the relatively low usage of sobriety
checkpoints,"' or the single, focused, informational roadblock so far
approved by the Court.237
d. Striking the Balance
Ubiquitous or even common demands for identity cards at stationary
checkpoints would change the nature of American life, and judicial
determination of their constitutionality would be a momentous event. All
aspects of the three-part equation for assessment of their reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment depend in great part on the checkpoints'
purpose, how they are structured, and the conditions that produce them.
For that reason, it is impossible to give any definitive answer in the
abstract to the question of identity checkpoints' constitutionality. The factladen nature of the constitutional analysis, however, may run up against
judicial reluctance to second-guess political choice in times of national
danger. This seems particularly true for measures receiving both executive
and legislative endorsement,23 as would almost certainly be the case for
any comprehensive national identity system.
That said, some tentative conclusions about national identity system
checkpoints are possible. First, those aimed mainly at undocumented aliens
would seem to have a good chance of being upheld, principally because of
the seriousness of the problem and the nation's inability to solve it despite
decades of legislative and enforcement efforts. To the extent that potential
terrorists lurk among the undocumented, there is additional justification.
It seems likely, too, that such identity checkpoints would have a reasonable
rate of success, at least initially, as measured by the Court's undemanding
standards. Unlike terrorism checkpoints, those that focused on immigration
offenders would be less likely to have false positive results (identifying
U.S. citizens or lawful aliens as unlawful aliens), and would thereby keep
to a minimum unfounded seizures resulting from these identity checks. 9

235. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 551-52.
236. Illinois v. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. 885, 890 (2004).
237. Id.
238. Issacharoff& Pildes, supra note 216.
239. At first glance, this might seem like another example of what David Cole has described
as a "sacrifice [of] the liberties of noncitizens in furtherance of the citizenry's purported security."
Cole, supra note 206, at 957. Even if imposed principally to apprehend undocumented aliens,
though, checkpoints would impact all people equally. In that sense, they do not involve profiling
or targeting of non-citizens. Immigration-focused checkpoints would be a law enforcement
technique aimed at enforcing a body of law that, by its nature, affects only those who cannot prove
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This discussion assumes that immigration checkpoints would require
identity cards of all persons passing through, not just those who "look" or
"sound" foreign.240 The absence of police discretion in who is exposed to
" ' was an important
an initial stop, particularly in contrast to roving patrols,24
242 In that case,
reason the Court upheld the checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte.
though, the Court did approve two other forms of official discretion: the
choice of checkpoint locations243 and the referral for secondary inspection
of persons of "apparent Mexican ancestry." 2" As noted above, the use of
a national identity card at immigration-focused checkpoints eliminates the
second type of discretion. Freedom to choose checkpoint location would
remain, however, and make possible troubling ethnic selection. In theory,
checkpoints designed to catch illegal immigrants from Mexico, for
example, could then be put in and around Mexican neighborhoods, or
those aimed at terrorists from the Middle East placed near Arab population
centers. Establishing, as they would, ethnic enclaves subject to "border
control," such decisions would have a profound impact, even if legal.
Apart from immigration enforcement, checkpoints directed at catching
potential terrorists would, and should, mainly fail to pass muster under the
Fourth Amendment. Even if suspects' names were known, huge numbers
of people would need to be stopped in the hopes of locating a very small
collection of individuals, unless the search were geographically limited.245
As for the profiling of potential terrorists, it is at a very rudimentary stage,
and its coupling with identification checkpoints would in all likelihood
yield a low rate of success and a large number of wrongful investigative
detentions. Despite the obvious importance ofpreventing further domestic
attacks, these likely results should stand in the way of finding such general
anti-terrorism identity card checkpoints to be reasonable seizures under the
Fourth Amendment. The outcome would probably be different, however,

their lawful presence.
240. The absurdity of the latter category is illustrated by the fact that in 2003 it would have
included two candidates for California's governorship.
241. CompareDelaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,659 (1979) (holding that discretionary spot
checks violate the Fourth Amendment, despite the state's interest in promoting public safety) and
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) (requiring reasonable suspician to stop
vehicles to search for illegal aliens, except at border or its functional equivalents).
242. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,558-59 (1976)("[C]heckpoint operations
both appear to and actually involve less discretionary enforcement activity [than random stops]. The
regularized manner in which established checkpoints are operated is visible evidence, reassuring
to law-abiding motorists, that the stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public
interest.").
243. Id. at 559.
244. See supratext accompanying note 191.
245. For an argument in favor of "seizures of groups" as defined by place and time (not, for
example, by race), see Stuntz, supra note 82, at 2163-69.
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at especially sensitive locations, such as airports, monuments, public
buildings, or so-called "National Special Security Events."2 '
E. Summary

Existing Fourth Amendment law, then, would allow a fair amount of
identity checking, but forbid certain important techniques. Nothing in the
Fourth Amendment bars official requests for identification from any
person at any time, as long as the person is not "seized" in the process.
This means that people could be required to present identification
whenever they are already stopped, as, for example, at registration
procedures, and could be asked, but not compelled, to present
identification at other times under the so-called "consensual encounter"
doctrine. These two kinds of interactions alone would encompass a fairly
large amount of identity checking.
In addition, when grounds to stop an individual already exist, as, for
example, in the relatively unusual instances when there is probable cause
or reasonable suspicion of criminality, under Court precedent there is no
Fourth Amendment objection to official demands for the person's identity
card. In fact, the requirement that people carry an identity card would be
useful in the investigation of those stopped on suspicion and in the
processing of arrestees. By far, the most common lawful seizure is a traffic
stop. There is a real danger that the desire to run an identity check would
add one more temptation for police to perform traffic stops for ulterior
purposes.
On the other hand, the Fourth Amendment does not allow
nonvoluntary, random, suspicionless identity checks. To that extent, the
specter of law enforcement officers demanding "your papers, please" on
an individual, discretionary basis is barred by the Constitution. Moreover,
identity checkpoints could not be established willy-nilly. They would,
though, probably be constitutionally reasonable for certain purposes in
certain circumstances. If the Supreme Court follows its own roadblock
precedents in an intellectually honest way, the outcome will very much
246. When an event is designated a National Special Security Event, the Secret Service
becomes the lead agency for the design and implementation of the operational security plan. U.S.
Secret Serv., National Special Security Events, at http://www.secretservice.gov/nsse.shtml (last
visited Mar. 28,2004). In 2002, these included the Winter Olympics, Super Bowl, World Economic
Forum, and State of the Union Address. Dep't of Homeland Security, NationalSpecial Security
Events, at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?themc=30&content=55 (last visited Mar. 28,
2004). See also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 5.31 U.S. 32,47-48 (2000) (distinguishing searches
"at places like airports and government buildings, where the need for such measures to ensure
public safety can be particularly acute"); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 274 (2000) (holding that
Fourth Amendment expectations of privacy diminished in certain places, including airports);
WAYNE LAFAvE, 4 SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 10.6, at 617-63 (3d. ed. 1996) (discussing airport and
other area entry searches).
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depend on the scope of the problem checkpoints are designed to address,
their effectiveness in doing so, and the degree of interference with free
movement they entail. On these factors, general checkpoints (outside of
sensitive locations) designed to profile terrorists should probably be found
to be unreasonable. Widespread use of checkpoints to identify and
apprehend undocumented noncitizens, however, would most likely be
upheld.
IV.

DATA GENERATION, COLLECTION, AND RETENTION

At the same time an identity check taps into existing databases, it can
also generate new data by inputting the location and activity of the person
whose identification card is being read. For example, everyone is now
required to present some form of identity token in the process of taking a
flight. In addition to indicating whether the passenger was a flight risk (or
perhaps an undocumented alien or wanted criminal), the same readable
token could easily create new data, such as the location, time and date the
token was read, and even the flight and itinerary. The database would then
contain information about the person's location and activities that it did not
previously have. This information could be used not only in subsequent
identity checks but also potentially for more general law enforcement or
other purposes.247
Clearly, the compelled collection of this data would impact personal
privacy and what might be called the right of anonymity.24 People would

247. See Am.BAR ASS'N CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMM., ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ELECTRONIC SURVELLANCE, SECTION B: TECHNoLoGIcALLY-AssIsTED
PHYSICAL SURVEI.LANCE 43 (3d. ed. 1999) ("[T]he results of tracking operations... can be

preserved well after the surveillance ends, in theory indeterminately. This capability raises the
specter of extensive libraries that retain information on vast numbers of individuals in perpetuity.").
The ACLU characterizes the possibilities this way:
When a police officer or security guard scans your ID card with his pocket barcode reader, for example, will a permanent record be created of that check,
including the time and your location? How long before office buildings, doctors'
offices, gas stations, highway tolls, subways and buses incorporate the ID card
into their security or payment systems for greater efficiency? The end result could
be a nation where citizens' movements inside their own country are monitored and
recorded through these "internal passports."
American Civil Liberties Union, 5 Problems With National ID Cards, at
http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfm?ID=13501&c=39 (last visited Mar. 28, 2004).
248. The United States Supreme Court obliquely recognized this threat in Whalen v. Roe, as
it was upholding a statute requiring the reporting to a state agency, with patients' names, of
controlled substances prescriptions: "We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the
accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or other massive
government files." 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977). See also Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy:
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know that the government has information about their movements and
activities, some of a private or even intimate nature. They might change
their behavior, not for fear of being caught doing something illegal but
because they were reluctant to contribute to a permanent, government-held
record of their actions.2 49 The issue here, though, is not simply whether
identity checks would compromise individual privacy, but whether they
would do so in such a way as to constitute a "search" under the Fourth
Amendment.250 This Part will evaluate the potential information
generation, collection, and storage aspects of a national identity system
under current Fourth and Fifth Amendment law and indicate how such a
system might cause the law to change. As with seizures, the answers to
these questions depend on the circumstances, as well as the nature of the
information itself.
A. RegistrationProcedures
As mentioned above, in registration procedures, an individual provides
personal information to a public or private entity, often, but not always, in
person.25' There is a surprising number of registration occasions in modem
American life.252 In addition, private businesses collect and retain
"staggering amounts of personal information about American citizens and
compil[e] it into electronic dossiers designed to predict the way people

Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISs. L.J. 213, 237-52

(2002) (advocating recognition of a right to anonymity).
249. Id.at 251 ("People who know they are under government surveillance will act less
spontaneously, more deliberately, less individualistically, and more conventionally; conduct on the
streets that is outside the mainstream, susceptible to suspicious interpretation, or merely
conspicuous-even if perfectly harmless-will diminish and perhaps even be officially
squelched.").
250. There are arguments that data collection through identity checks would also compromise
First Amendment freedoms of speech and association and freedom of movement, but this Article
will not address them. See AM. BAR ASS'N CRftCNAL JUSnCE STANDARDS COMM., supra note 247,
at 23 ("Law enforcement use of technologically-assisted physical surveillance
can ...
diminish... freedom of speech, association and travel ....); cf Slobogin, supra note 248,
at 252-63 (discussing the chilling effect camera surveillance has on certain activities protected by
the First Amendment).
251. See supra text accompanying note 65 (giving as examples: registration for driver's
licenses, medical services, schools, and flights, as well as employment eligibility verification).
Library use is another example, as recognized by the USA PATRIOT Act. See Am. Library Ass'n,
The USA Patriot Act in the Library, at http://www.ala.org/ala/oif/ifissues/usapatriotactlibrary.htm
(last visited Mar. 28, 2004).
252. Andrew J.McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response
to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 63, 78 (2003). "Consumer data profiles may
contain information pertaining to some of the most intimate aspects of human life: religion, health,
finances, political affiliation, leisure activities, and much more." Id. at 70.
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think and behave. 25 a If a national identity number were used in these
procedures, the data could end up in a database linked to that number and
be accessible for government use. This, in fact, is already true of a great
deal of personal information through its association with Social Security
numbers.254 A centralized national database would only enhance the digital
picture of a person's life.255
Deciding whether official access to such information is a "search"
under the Fourth Amendment, therefore requiring a warrant, probable
cause, or some other evidentiary basis, would put to the test a series of
cases in which the Court has applied a concept of assumption of the risk
of surveillance. The Fourth Amendment aspects of government-mandated
data generation were first raised in CaliforniaBankers Ass'n v. Shultz, a
case challenging various aspects of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970.256 The
Act authorized the Secretary to require banks to retain, with identifying
information, their customers' financial records, including copies ofchecks
over $100.25? These record-keeping requirements, plaintiffs contended,
constituted an illegal search and seizure.25 The Court curtly dismissed this
claim on the ground that neither the Act nor the implementing regulations
"require that any information contained in the records be disclosed to the
Government; both the legislative history and the regulations make specific

253. Id. at 65.
254. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
255. See United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2003).
As every man goes through life he fills in a number of forms for the record.... A
man's answer to one question on one form becomes a little thread ....
There are
hundreds of little threads radiating from every man, millions of threads in all. If
these threads were suddenly to become visible, the whole day would look like a
spider's web.
Id. at 1114 n.35 (quoting ALEXANDER SOLZHENrrSYN, CANcER WARD 192 (Nicholas Bethel &
David Burg trans., Modem Library ed. 1995)).
256. 416 U.S. 21, 25 (1974).
257. Id. at 32. As the Court later explained in UnitedStates v. Miller, one object of the Act was
to make bank records available for investigative purposes. 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976).
Many banks traditionally kept permanent records of their depositors' accounts,
although not all banks did so and the practice was declining in recent years. By
requiring that such records be kept by all banks, the Bank Secrecy Act... is
merely an attempt to facilitate the use of a proper and long-standing law
enforcement technique by insuring [sic] that records are available when they are
needed.
Id.
258. Cal. BankersAss n, 416 U.S. at 43 (1974).
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reference to the fact that
access to the records is to be controlled by
259
existing legal process.
When, in United States v. Miller, a depositor complained that the
prosecution obtained his bank records by defective process, the Supreme
Court held that bank customers had no expectation of privacy in their bank
account records. 2' A depositor such as Miller, the Court held, "takes the
risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be
conveyed by that person to the Government. 2 ' 1 It continued:
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a
third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities,
even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it
will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence
placed in the third party will not be betrayed. 62
The Court has upheld the installation of pen registers, which record
telephone numbers dialed, for the same reason: the caller assumes the risk
that the phone company will divulge these numbers and, therefore, has no
expectation of privacy in that information.263 This theory would encompass
just about all information "voluntarily" conveyed to third parties in the
course of 2one's
activities, including most information in commercial
4
databases. "

259. Id. at 52. The Court went on to hold that, as to information the banks obtain from a
customer "simply because the Government wants it," the information is sufficiently described and
limited and sufficiently related to commerce clause power as to withstand a Fourth Amendment
challenge made by the banks. Id. at 67. It never reached depositors' Fourth Amendment claims in
this regard, concluding that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Id. at 68.
260. 425 U.S. at 437.
261. Id. at 443.
262. Id. (citing Hoffav. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1996) and Lopez v. United States,
373 U.S. 427 (1963), cases involving government informants being sent, without judicial
authorization, to converse with suspects and report, record, or transmit the suspects' statements).
263. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) ("When he used his phone, petitioner
voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and 'exposed' that
information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the
risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.").
264. Certain statutory protections now exist for personal records. Right to Financial Privacy
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3406 (2000) (permitting depositors to challenge subpoenas for their financial
records except where notifying them would "seriously jeopardize an investigation"); Electronic
Communication Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2000) (requiring court approval for government
access to telephone records). It is not clear whether the existence of such statutes would be found
to create an expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. Cf California v. Greenwood, 486
U.S. 35, 39 (1988) (holding that the state constitutional right to privacy in garbage left at the curb
does not create a reasonable expectation of privacy for Fourth Amendment purposes); Nixon v.
Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457-58 (1977) (assuming pattern of de facto
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There are serious conceptual and practical problems with this approach,
however. Conceptually, when applied to information supplied under some
assurance of confidentiality, as with bank records, an individual cannot
realistically be said to have assumed the risk of divulgence; most people's
assumption would be the opposite.265 Furthermore, why should disclosure
to one person or entity be equated with disclosure to the entire world,
particularly to law enforcement personnel? 26 Privacy expectations do not
need to be all or none and are not in real life. 26 After all, the fact that one
opens one's home to social guests does not mean that one has no
expectation of privacy as against the police.268 Practically, the holdings
above present citizens with a Hobson's choice ofnot participating in many
of the essentials of modem life or giving up the confidentiality of their
personal information. These cases might be described as adopting the
hermit theory of privacy expectations: people only have an expectation of
privacy in what they keep totally to themselves.269
Beyond these objections, the theory falls of its own weight when
applied to information requiredto be passed to the government, as would
be the case if a national identity card was necessary for certain registrations
and the information was then, by statutory or regulatory mandate,
transmitted to the system's computers. The risk of disclosure would be
imposed, not assumed, and would not be a risk at all but a certainty.27 °

presidential control and congressional acquiescence gives rise to legitimate expectation of privacy
in presidential papers). In the context of a national identity system with data-gathering powers, this
would likely be a moot point, however. By establishing federal access to certain records, the
enabling legislation would thereby eradicate any inconsistent prior statutory protections, destroying
any expectation of privacy that might otherwise have been present.
265. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAzE: THE DESTRUCION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 61

(2000) ("The justices' sweeping generalizations in these cases bear little relation to the kind of
privacy that citizens expect in the real world.").
266. See Brian J. Sen', Great Expectations ofPrivacy: A New Model for Fourth Amendment
Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583, 604 (1989) ("Simply because individuals have, to a limited
degree, exposed an activity to public view, the Court should not conclude that they have completely
relinquished all fourth amendment protection.").
267. The Supreme Court recently acknowledged as much in Fergusonv. City of Charleston,
532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001) ("The reasonable expectation of privacy enjoyed by the typical patient
undergoing diagnostic tests in a hospital is that the results of those tests will not be shared with
nonmedical personnel without her consent."); see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 749 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
268. Indeed, not only does the homeowner retain her expectation of privacy, but her social
guest may share in it. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 99 (1990).
269. Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[U]nless a person is prepared to forgo
use of what for many has become a personal or professional necessity, he cannot help but accept
the risk of surveillance.").
270. This would be analogous to Justice Marshall's hypothetical of an official announcement
that henceforth mail or private phone conversations would be randomly monitored, forcing citizens
to assume the risk of government intrusion. Id.at 750.
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These differences distinguish the bank records and telephone pen register
cases.27' The two requirements that information be linked to a national
identity number and transmitted to the government for inclusion in its
identity system database make all the difference, even if the information
itself would have been generated anyway in the registration transaction. In
addition, many occasions for registration, such as education, medical care,
and travel, involve activities that are central to a free and full, life.2"
Together, these factors obviate the fictions of voluntary third-party
disclosure and assumed risk and should cause governmentally-mandated
collection and transmission of personal data to be found to be a search
under the Fourth Amendment.2 3 Whether the Court would reach this
conclusion is not so clear-cut in light of its record.274
If it did conclude that such compelled data collection was a search, that
finding would not end the inquiry. The Court would then need to address
the reasonableness of the practice. Given what could be characterized as
the non-criminal purpose of such data collection,2"5 the analysis used for
271. Official constraint on choice was not enough to save the homeowner, though, who was
compelled by ordinance to leave his garbage at the curb from being held to have assumed the risk

that "animals, children, scavengers, [and] snoops"---along with police-would go through that
garbage. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40, 54-55 (1988).
272. As pointed out by Justice Marshall in his dissent in Smith, 442 U.S. at 749, this
distinguishes the consensual monitoring cases on which risk assumption analysis is built because
one can certainly live a full life without speaking to a given individual. In other words, talking to
an unreliable auditor is truly a risk one assumes, while engaging in these other activities is not. See
id. at 750. On the other hand, the Court has characterized the disclosure of private medical
information to doctors, hospitals, insurance companies and public health agencies as "an essential
part of moder medical practice." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977).
273. In a dissent in Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 84-85 (1974), that nicely
anticipated the kind of data collection possible in a national identity system, Justice Douglas wrote:
It would be highly useful to governmental espionage to have... reports from all
our bookstores, all our hardware and retail stores, all our drugstores. These records
[in addition to financial records] might be 'useful' in criminal
investigations.... [Doctors, lawyers, creditors, political allies, social connections,
religious affiliation, educational interests, papers and magazines read] are all tied
to one's social security number; and now that we have the data banks, these other
items will enrich that storehouse and make it possible for a bureaucrat-by
pushing one button-to get in an instant the names of the [millions of] Americans
who are subversives or potential and likely candidates.
274. The majority in Smith, 442 U.S. at 740-41 n.5, was at least willing to entertain the
possibility of using a "normative inquiry" rather than risk analysis to determine the applicability
of the Fourth Amendment in some circumstances. See also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745,
786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[SIince it is the task of the law to form and project, as well as
mirror and reflect, we should not ... merely recite.., risks without examining the desirability of
saddling them upon society.").
275. Cf supra text accompanying notes 143-71.
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other administrative searches would probably be applied. As with
regulatory seizures, this methodology balances "the [government's] need
to search against the invasion which the search entails. 27 6 Using this
approach, the Court has upheld health and safety inspections of homes
without any indication of individual wrongdoing, as well as a host of other
suspicionless special needs searches.2 77
On the other hand, it has never upheld the kind of blanket invasion of
personal privacy the transmission of registration information into national
databases would involve. While it is true that such personal information
would be used to further important government interests, this practice
would appear to lack many other attributes of the administrative searches
sustained by the Court. For example, as a novel expansion of governmental
data collection, it would not carry the "long history ofjudicial and public
acceptance" that home health and safety inspections have had.27 Even
though amassing personal information in comprehensive databases might
ultimately increase their usefulness, the marginal utility is uncertain, if not
completely speculative. An enormous amount of data about virtually every
person in the United States would have to be collected and retained in the
hope that some of it might give some hint of terrorism or other illegal
activity. The absolute effectiveness ofterrorist profiling using a wide array
of personal data has yet to be demonstrated.279 There can thus be no claim
that no "other... technique would achieve acceptable results."28
With respect to the degree of intrusion, much would turn on how long
the information would be retained, what parties would have access to it,
and the purposes for which it would be used. These factors figured in the
Court's assessment in Whalen v. Roe of New York's centralized filing
system for controlled substances prescriptions, identifiable by patient
name."' Challenged by doctors and patients on right-to-privacy grounds,282
this mandatory reporting program was upheld by a unanimous Court. The

276. Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
277. 4 LAFAVE, supranote 246, at 366-841.
278. Camara,387 U.S. at 537. In fact, on the federal level, Congress has imposed protection
for data privacy in a number of instances. See supra note 264.
279. For an argument that this kind of data mining will ultimately be productive, see John M.
Poindexter, Findingthe Face of Terrorin Data,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2003, at A25 ("The only way
to detect... terrorists is to look for patterns of activity that are based on observations from past
terrorist attacks as well as estimates about how terrorists will adapt to our measures to avoid
detection."). Poindexter's proposal to implement this vision through the Total Information
Awareness data-mining procedures was thwarted by both public opposition and congressional
restrictions. See McClurg, supra note 252, at 63-64.
280. Camara,387 U.S. at 537.
281. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
282. While the Court did not have before it a pure Fourth Amendment claim, it rejected a
Fourth Amendment-based right to privacy argument. Id. at 604 n.32.
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program contained limitations on who could access the data and made
unauthorized disclosure a crime; no instances of unauthorized use had
occurred in the first twenty months of the program's operation.2" 3
These and other features of the New York drug prescription library in
Whalen point the way for designing a mandatory data collection system
that could pass as a reasonable search. Strict limits on disclosure are
essential." 4 After an initially broader proposal, the projected CAPPS II
airline security system, for example, will not notify law enforcement for
all criminal warrants, but will only provide notification of those for crimes
of violence." 5 Because a national identity system's more extensive
database would potentially be useful in civil or criminal cases, additional
restrictions, such as barring the use of database contents in litigation in a
manner akin to a privilege, might also be advisable.28 6
In a national identity system, limiting retention of registration records
would conflict with compiling the fullest picture of a person's movements
and activities. Obviously, the longer records were retained the more
complete would be that picture, though older data are usually less
informative than more recent data. Record retention also has surfaced as
an issue in the design of CAPPS II. At first, the Department of
Transportation proposed to retain data about certain individuals for up to
fifty years.28 7 In response to a flood of negative comments, the Department
(now of Homeland Security) currently proposes to retain information about
U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens for only a matter of days after
completion of travel.288 The Court in Whalen noted with approval that New
York destroyed its stored prescription records after five years,289 and it
seems likely that the shorter the retention period, the more reasonable a
records database will appear.

283. Id. at 593-94, 600-01.
284. See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 765-66
(1986) (striking down requirement of physician reports of abortion information, in part because
highly personal information in the publicly available reports could be linked with particular
individuals, which indeed was the purpose of the requirement). Even a comprehensive
nondisclosure policy can be violated, however, as happened when JetBlue breached its own privacy
policy and gave five million passenger itineraries to a defense contractor that used the information
as part of a study of how to identify "high risk" airline customers. Greg Schneider & Keith L.
Alexander, Plan to Screen Air Travelers Hits Bump, WASH. POST., Sept. 25, 2003, Al3.
285. Notice of Status of System of Records, 68 Fed. Reg. 45,265, 45,268 (Aug. I, 2003).
286. For example, data collected at hotel or car rental registrations could easily be relevant in
a criminal conspiracy prosecution or even a matrimonial action.
287. Notice of Status of System of Records, 68 Fed. Reg. 45, 265, 45,268 (Aug. 1, 2003).
288. Id. at 45, 267-69 (reporting that record retention for non-resident aliens is still under
consideration; furthermore, for all persons, existing records gathered from other government
agencies, including intelligence information, will be retained for up to three years, or until
superseded).
289. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 594 (1977).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

55

Florida Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 1

FLORIDA LAW RE1IEW

[Vol. 56

In sum, although mandatory reporting to government databases of the
kind of registration data that is an incident of twenty-first century
American life should be found to be a "search" under the Fourth
Amendment, it might well pass as a reasonable one. The outcome of the
reasonableness balance would depend in part on the purpose of the data
collection and its effectiveness in achieving that purpose. But even where
the success rate is low, as it undoubtedly would be in terrorist profiling,
restrictions on use, retention, and disclosure might well tip the balance
toward29Fourth Amendment acceptability, at least during its experimental
phase.

0

Governmental collection of registration data would also withstand a
Fifth Amendment self-incrimination challenge, even if some of the
information might provide "a link in the chain of evidence needed to
prosecute. ' 29 ' Suppose, for example, a flight school were obligated to
transmit personal data about its students, including the fact of enrollment,
to a governmental database, and that these data helped trigger a terrorist
profile or were used in a criminal prosecution. 292 The main answer to a
Fifth Amendment objection would be that the government did not compel
production of the information; the person voluntarily supplied it when he
registered with the school. 293 As the Court said in Fisherv. United States,
"the Fifth Amendment protects against 'compelled self-incrimination, not
[the disclosure of private] information. '294 "It follows that the selfincrimination privilege is not available to a customer, patient, or client of
'
a third party [required] to produce its records relating to that person."295
Most, if not all, database material would probably come from third parties;
if so, no Fifth Amendment self-incrimination rights would be affected.
Because a national identity system would probably not require an
individual to report her own whereabouts or private activities directly to
290. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS'N CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMM., supra note 247, § 29.1(d)(vi)-(vii) at 37, 42-44 (recommending disclosure of technologically assisted physical
surveillance for designated lawful purposes only and disposition ofrecords no longer required); see

generally United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1096, 1113 (9th Cir. 2003) (summarizing case
law upholding DNA collection from persons convicted of federal crimes under the DNA Analysis
Backlog Elimination Act of 2000,42 U.S.C. § 14135a, and state analogues; see also United States
v. Plotts, 347 F.3d 873, 879 (10th Cir. 2003) (upholding such DNA collection).
291. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
292. This example is meant to illustrate the "real and appreciable" likelihood of self-

incrimination that is a prerequisite to Fifth Amendment concern. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591,
599 (1896). But see Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S.Ct. 1994, 2001 (2003) (suggesting that no Fifth
Amendment issue arises unless and until the compelled information is offered in a criminal
prosecution).
293. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,392 (1976); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
322, 341 (1973).
294. Fisher,425 U.S. at 401 (quoting United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225,233 n.7 (1975)).
295. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRuNAL PROCEDURE § 8.12(e) at 247 n.47 (2d. ed. 1999).
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a government database, the discussion of this form of data collection can
be fairly summary. One reason for the unlikelihood of a mandatory selfreporting scheme is that its permissibility under the Fifth Amendment is
much less clear-cut than that of reporting by third parties. An analysis of
the self-incrimination issue would necessitate a choice between a line of
cases barring self-reporting obligations that produce clearly incriminating
communications296 and those where the likelihood of self-incrimination is
less and/or the reporting is more directly linked to a non-criminal
regulatory scheme.297 Significantly, among the latter group of cases is
California v. Byers, in which the Court narrowly upheld a hit-and-run
statute requiring any driver involved in an accident to stop and provide his
or her name and address.29 8 The resolution of the conflict between these
lines of authority would depend on the precise contours of the selfreporting demanded by the national identity system, as well as on any
restrictions on the information's use. 2 It is possible that self-reporting
could be structured in a way as to avoid offending the Fifth Amendment.
Barring the information's use in a criminal prosecution would certainly
suffice, and such a restriction would not greatly interfere with employing
the information in profiling for further surveillance. As a practical matter,
though, self-reporting would surely be far less reliable and complete than
mandated data reporting by third parties. For those reasons alone, a
national identity system could not sensibly depend on individuals
296. See, e.g., Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 60-61 (1968) (requiring gamblers to
identify themselves and pay an occupational tax); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 70 (1968)
(requiring gamblers to identify themselves and pay an occupational tax); Haynes v. United States,
390 U.S. 85, 100 (1968) (requirement to register illegally possessed firearm); Albertson v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 81 (1965) (requiring registration by members of
the Communist Party).
297. Baltimore City Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 561-62 (1990) (order
to produce child under supervision); California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) (motor
vehicle accident report).
298. Byers, 402 U.S. at 452. In his concurrence, Justice Harlan advanced an argument for
rejecting a self-incrimination challenge that resonates with proposed data collection in a national
identity system:
Technological progress creates an ever-expanding need for governmental
information about individuals. If the individual's ability in any particular case to
perceive a genuine risk of self-incrimination is to be a sufficient condition for
imposition of use restrictions on the government in all self-reporting contexts, then
the privilege threatens the capacity of the government to respond to societal needs
with a realistic mixture of criminal sanctions and other regulatory devices.
Id. at 452.
299. Use for a non-criminal, regulatory purpose would certainly enhance prospects for
acceptance, and that, in turn, might depend on whether a terrorist apprehension program were
deemed to be regulatory, criminal, or military. See supra text accompanying notes 143-58.
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providing information about their own activities. Avoidance of any
substantial Fifth Amendment self-incrimination problem suggests the same
course.
B. Consensual Encounters, Terry Stops, Citations,andArrests
In contrast, data generation and collection associated with consensual
encounters, stops, and arrests does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment
ban on unreasonable searches, though for slightly different reasons in each
case.
1. Consensual Encounters
The same consent that prevents certain encounters from being classified
as seizures under the Fourth Amendment should keep their attendant
production of information from constituting searches. Suppose, for
example, a person pauses and presents her identity card in response to a
request for that card. Suppose, too, that data showing the card was checked
at that particular time and place are added to the government database
while her identification is being "run" against that database. The database
would now contain additional information about this person: that she was
at place X at time Y and voluntarily presented her identity card. It might
very well also record the fact that her identity check showed nothing
unusual.
For two related reasons, this encounter does not amount to a search.
First, to the extent she knew the workings of the system, a fairly likely
possibility ifa national identity system were in place, by having voluntarily
stopped and presented her identification card she has consented to having
this information included. Second, even if she was unaware of its
implications, here, unlike in the registration procedures above, she has
truly assumed the risk of this data collection and storage. The person who
has viewed her card now knows her identity, and of course, also knows the
time and place the card was read. That person is free to report, record, or
transmit that information, and the fact that this reporting is done
surreptitiously, or electronically, has no bearing, the Court has held, on the
individual's expectation of privacy."
2. Terry Stops
Investigative stops, of course, do not contain this element of consent.
The question here is whether the same reasonable suspicion that justifies
stopping a person and demanding identification in the first place also
justifies recording and retaining that information with a date, time, and
300. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 754 (1971).
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location stamp. This data collection and retention clearly adds to the
imposition of a Terry stop. Now, instead of the "brief intrusion" described
by the Court in Terry, the individual has a "brief intrusion" plus an endless
record, not only of having been in a particular place at a particular time but
also perhaps ofhaving generated reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Because Terry was decided by balancing the governmental need for
investigative stops against their degree of individual intrusion, this
additional imposition threatens to upset Terry's balance.
It is a close question, but the Court would nevertheless probably permit
this practice, for several reasons. First, the observations underlying these
newly recorded data ordinarily occur in a public place, a law enforcement
action not usually subject to Fourth Amendment regulation.30' Second, the
individual is not being forced to provide any information beyond her
identification, an incident of a Terry stop the Court has already upheld.30 2
The additional information transmitted to the database-the time, the
place, and even the reason for the stop and its outcome-is all created by
the officer; in other words, there is no search involved in discovering or
recording these facts. Third, access to such stored information may serve
the purposes of investigative stops in general, confirming or dispelling the
suspicion of criminality. A person who claims to be "lost" in the vicinity
of high-value theft targets, for example, is less believable if he has been
"lost" there before.
There is no question that retaining data from a stop adds to its
intrusiveness when that data is linked to a particular person.30 3 This is
especially true when the investigative stop does not lead to arrest; an
individual could acquire a police "record" for activities that were not
criminal enough to produce an arrest, much less a conviction. 3" Whether
that extra weight on one side of the Terry scale would cause the Court to
bar this practice or insist on a higher level of criminal probability for its
use is much less clear.
3. Arrests and Traffic Citations
Recording and storing data associated with arrests and traffic citations
is unexceptional. As with Terry stops, other than the identification
supplied by the suspect, the information would have been observed and
recorded by the officer. Moreover, here there is probable cause for

301. See infra text accompanying notes 308-14.
302. See supra text accompanying note 105-07.
303. This kind of individual data collection is quite different from the systematic gathering of
information on, for example, traffic stops in general. See HARRIS, supra note 209, at 175-207.
304. For that reason, constraints on the use of this data should be built into any system that
collected and retained it. See supra text accompanying notes 281-88.
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detaining and processing the individual. It is not possible to adjudicate
traffic citations or arrests without collecting data about their circumstances.
The widespread practice of gathering and storing this data attests to its
acceptance.30 5 Arrest records are now used for charge, bail, sentencing
decisions, and in connection with the grant of certain licenses.30 6 There is
thus a demonstrated need for the collection and retention of arrest data and
no apparent Fourth Amendment objection to doing so. This is true even
though aggregation of arrest data in one database, or several linked ones,
is qualitatively different from the maintenance of discrete public records
in the originating jurisdictions.30 7
C. Checkpoints
Identification checkpoints present another opportunity for collecting,
and then storing information about the location of a particular individual
at a particular time. Ordinarily, official surveillance, even targeted
surveillance, of a person in public does not amount to a search under the
Fourth Amendment.30 8 In United States v. Knotts, the Supreme Court
applied this principle to the tracking of a beeper that government agents
had installed in a can of chloroform, a chemical used to manufacture
methamphetamine.3 °9 With the assistance of a monitoring device placed in
a helicopter, agents tracked the vehicle carrying the can to a particular
cabin and included this discovery in a search warrant application for the
cabin.3'0 Responding to defendant's argument that this monitoring was a
search, the Court stated, "A person travelling in an automobile on public
305. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 534 (2000) (requiring the U.S. Attorney General to "acquire,
collect, classify, and preserve identification, criminal identification, crime, and other records" and
make them available for official use by state and federal agencies).
306. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 252 (1949) (holding that arrests not resulting in
convictions may be considered for sentencing purposes); Tatum v. Rogers, No. 75 Civ. 2782
(CBM), 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1435 1, at *31-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (noting use of arrest records by
prosecutors in filing charges and judges in making bail decisions, and by licensing authorities).
307. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm.for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 764
(1989) ("[Tlhere is a vast difference between the public records that might be found after a diligent
search of courthouse files, county archives, and local police stations throughout the country and a
computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse of information.") (upholding Freedom of
Information Act exemption for rap sheets as involving an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy).
308. The classic statement of this point comes from the majority opinion in Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347,351 (1967) ("What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."); see also id. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) ("[Olbjects, activities, or statements that [a person] exposes to the 'plain view' of
outsiders are not 'protected' because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited.");
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984).
309. 460 U.S. 276, 278 (1980).
310. Id.
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thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements
from one place to another."3 1 The Court continued,
[t]he fact that the officers in this case relied not only on visual
surveillance, but on the use of the beeper... does not alter
the situation. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited
the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed
upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and
technology afforded them in this case.312
In Knotts, then, the Court placed official surveillance ofpublic movement,
and the use of technological aids to do so, outside the purview of the
Fourth Amendment. No longer could a person rely on his wiles or the
vagaries of human physical and mental abilities to preserve his public
anonymity. 313 Knotts, it might be said, ended the "sporting chance" age of
public surveillance and moved us into the era of big-game hunting.31 4
Knotts thus poses a major obstacle to any claim that information
garnered in a checkpoint stop would be the fruit of an unconstitutional
search. If the government can follow (or stop) people travelling in public,
presumably it can also record what it learns. With enough checkpoints,
though, it could virtually track everyone's movements. Knotts himself
raised the specter of "twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen,"
eliciting this response from the Court: "[I]f such dragnet type law
enforcement practices ... should eventually occur, there will be time
enough then to determine whether different constitutional principles may
be applicable. 3,1 5 The use of identification checkpoints to generate a
database of individual activities would certainly bring that day closer, but
the constitutional outcome would very much depend on the nature and
extent of such public surveillance. It is possible to imagine degrees of
checkpoint data collection that would fall well within the Supreme Court's
tolerance level.

311. Id.at 281.
312. Id. at 282.
313. See Taslitz, supranote 232, at 143 (noting that a radio transmitter is much more effective
and difficult to detect than a human observer).
314. In Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001), a majority of the Court found the use
of thermal imaging to detect heat patterns in the home to be a search under the Fourth Amendment.
That decision does not seriously undermine Knotts because, as the Court emphasized repeatedly,
Kyllo involved surveillance of a home, "the prototypical... area of protected privacy." Id. at 34;
see also Karo, 468 U.S. at 714-15. Furthermore, Kyllo's expectation of privacy depended also on
the fact that the technology in question "is not in general public use." Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. This
is probably not the case with tracking devices, and certainly not for checkpoint surveillance and
record keeping.
315. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283-84.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

61

Florida Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 1

FLORIDA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 56

D. Summary
National identity cards could be the fulcrum for a massive exercise in
government data collection. At the least, the resulting databases would
cause many people to experience a loss of privacy and a fear of the use (or
misuse) of their personal information. Whether such governmental
collection, use, and retention of personal data would constitute an
unreasonable search is far less certain.31 6 As reviewed above, under present
law the state can view and record a fair amount of publicly observable
activity and can collect data on otherwise justifiable police-citizen
interactions. These instances involve few real Fourth Amendment
concerns. Mandatory reporting of personal information raises the most
serious Fourth Amendment issue and should, this section contends, be
regarded as a governmental search. Nevertheless, it is likely that some
collection of data that has already been generated in daily life would be
tolerated under the case law permitting non-criminal administrative
searches. Comprehensive restrictions, particularly on disclosure and use,
as well as on the duration of information retention, would help this practice
pass constitutional muster. On the other hand, before the United States
comes close to becoming a "total information society," one would hope the
Supreme Court would call a halt to its previous acceptance of
governmentally mandated reporting. Just when that line will be crossed is
impossible to predict. Fifth Amendment self-incrimination objections
would not arise in governmental gathering of information given to third
parties.
V. CONCLUSION

The United States may never have or use a national identity card. Since
September 11,2001, however, the possibility has become real enough that
it is not too soon to attempt to evaluate the constitutionality under the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the kinds of practices a national identity
system might employ. It would be pointless and unwise to design a system
blatantly conflicting with these constitutional protections. Given the
expense and effort entailed in creating any national identity system, costs
and benefits should be evaluated at an early stage of its consideration. To

316. This Part has focused on the collection and retention of personal data incident to identity
checks, rather than the use made of that data. There is an argument that official use of computerized
data, in particular data-mining "in which the government is trolling for crimes rather than particular
criminals," is itself a search and is analogous to the general searches conducted in the Colonies
prior to the American revolution. JEFFREY ROSEN, THENAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING SECURrrY AND
FREEDOM iN AN ANXIOUS AGE 148-49 (2004). General warrants were outlawed by the Fourth
Amendment. As Rosen himself seems to acknowledge, though, such "dataveillance" is applied to
data in which, according to the Court, there is no expectation of privacy. Id.
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the extent that the Constitution would stand in the way of particular
national identity card attributes or uses, the projected benefits will be
correspondingly reduced, decreasing the card's overall desirability. In
addition, if there is going to be a national identity system, it is advisable to
consider the Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues in advance of its design,
so as to minimize civil liberties intrusions and maximize the prospects for
judicial acceptance.
This Article has attempted to indicate what those constitutional
obstacles and issues might be, as well as what practices present little or no
problem. With respect to the Fourth Amendment seizures that might be
implicated in official demands for an identity token, a wide range of
identification occasions would not present much constitutional difficulty.
These occasions might include demands for identification during
registration procedures, during investigative and traffic stops, and incident
to arrests, as well as requests for identification during consensual
encounters.
There is one outright prohibition on official insistence on presentation
of an identity card, and two important caveats. Suspicionless stops to check
identity cards would be unreasonable seizures. One caveat concerns the use
of checkpoints for terrorist profiling. Unless extraordinary circumstances
develop, or there is a quantum leap in the effectiveness of this technique,
checkpoint stops to link people to a database in order to profile potential
terrorists should be held to be unreasonable seizures. On the other hand,
checkpoints designed to identify unauthorized migrants or known suspects
seem likely to receive judicial acceptance. The second caveat about the
design of a national identity system is the danger it poses for drastically
increasing pretextual traffic stops-stops for genuine traffic violations
undertaken not to enforce the law but for the purpose of checking
motorists' identification. This practice is lawful under the Fourth
Amendment, but, in the absence of a wholesale reinterpretation of the
pretextual stop doctrine, legislation for a national identity system should
attempt to prevent it, difficult as that might be. In fact, this threat by itself
counsels against a national identity system.
A review of the Fourth Amendment issues in government-mandated
data collection, retention, and use shows that recording public encounters,
including normal investigative stops and arrests, as well as checkpoint
arrivals, would be unlikely to raise serious objection. Recording
investigative stops would probably be upheld despite considerable grounds
for finding them to upset the carefully constructed balance sustaining the
constitutionality of seizures based upon reasonable suspicion.
Governmental acquisition of personal data already supplied in connection
with some ordinary service poses the most serious Fourth Amendment
issue. This procedure should be treated as a search, but it may be a
reasonable one, particularly if accompanied by restrictions on retention and
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use, at least until it reaches some indefinable level of societal surveillance.
Thus far, the Supreme Court seems willing to accept a certain amount of
government database creation by way of gathering information already in
existence.
Where this leaves the prospects for a national identity system is hard to
say, particularly because a definitive judgment about its constitutionality
can only come after its features are defined, and even then only with the
litigation necessary to resolve many ofthe close questions identified in this
Article. Clearly, the Fourth Amendment stands in the way of the kind of
total surveillance and anytime identification demands that would allow
such a system to operate at maximum efficiency. On the other hand, there
is still a fair amount the government could do in both areas that would
withstand Fourth Amendment challenge. Indeed, this review reveals again
the truth of Katz v. United States' famous epigram that "the Fourth
Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional 'right to
privacy.' ' 317 Many aspects of a national identity system may arguably
intrude on privacy but not offend the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the
Fifth Amendment presents no significant obstacle to the primary functions
of a national identity system.
This review of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues should serve to
demonstrate to proponents of a national identity card that there are both
limits and dangers to its use. It should also make clear to those who see a
national identity system as an Orwellian nightmare that while the
Constitution stands somewhat athwart its path, it does not make such a
system impossible. Whether the kind of national identity system that could
operate lawfully is worth the financial, administrative, and social costs
would ultimately be a policy, not a legal, judgment. Much of the policy
assessment, though, involves consideration of the government's need for
a national identity card, its effectiveness, and its interference with privacy
and free movement. To a large degree, these are the same factors on which
the constitutionality of a national identity system turns. This legal analysis
thus provides a useful perspective on the desirability, as well as the
constitutionality of adopting a national identity card.

317. 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) ("[The protection of a person's general right to privacy-his
right to be let alone by other people" is left to non-constitutional sources of law.).
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